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Abstract 
In what follows the first in-depth study of the South African carbon market is undertaken.  
The study begins by laying out the current state of the global carbon market and some 
related critiques.  Turning to the South African context, four Clean Development 
Mechanism projects are examined in-depth.  These include the controversial Bisasar 
Road Landfill project in Durban, the Sasol fuel-switching project in Sasolburg, plus the 
South Bellville Landfill gas capture and the Kuyasa low-cost housing energy upgrade 
projects in Cape Town.  In addition to analyzing these projects this study also examines 
the social and institutional capacity in South Africa to provide oversight of this market.  
Through this examination it is shown that many of the more dubious trends in the global 
carbon market are being replicated in South Africa, particularly around the so-called 
“low-hanging fruit” projects that generate a lot of cheap credits but few other benefits.  
Just how this situation might get resolved is the focus of the concluding chapter that 
offers a number of suggested reforms. 
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Foreword  
This study was borne out of equal parts of frustration and opportunity.  Beginning with 
the former, my focus when I came to the Faculty of Environmental Studies at York 
University was to study carbon taxes as an ideal response to our climate crisis.  I first 
became concerned about climate change during my undergrad studies at the University of 
Victoria and grew quite impatient with local environmental organizations (ENGOs) who 
seemed to content to focus on more local issues than this global threat.   During an 
internship with Ontario’s Select Commissioner for Alternative Energy, Steve Gilchrist, I 
became acutely aware of the regulatory field for energy that heavily favoured coal and 
fossil fuels to the detriment of the renewable energy we need to combat the climate crisis.  
Thus carbon taxes on the dirtier forms of energy seemed like an ideal way to level the 
regulatory playing field and attract the necessary green investments.  Thus carbon taxes, 
as part of a larger rubric of environmental fiscal reform, became the central aspect of my 
Plan of Study and I considered the issue in a number of courses I enrolled in during my 
first year.   
Being in the combined MES/LLB program I began to attend Osgoode Hall Law 
School full time in September 2004, though my research interest remained in climate 
change policy and carbon taxes specifically.  During my first semester at Osgoode I had 
the opportunity to do some volunteer work for the Green Budget Coalition who shared 
my passion for carbon taxes.  However our proposals for such a policy fell on deaf ears 
with the federal government, as well as all of the opposition parties.  Even the major 
ENGOs working on climate issues at the time were reluctant to lobby strongly for carbon 
taxes, though many of them supported the idea in principle. 
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By early 2005 my research focus began to shift away from carbon taxes, which no 
one seemed to be discussing anyway, to carbon trading, which was one many more 
people’s lips.  In January 2005 I attended the World Social Forum in Porto Allegre 
Brazil, where I had the chance to meet with activists who opposed carbon trading as well 
as community leaders who had first had first-hand experience with some rather dubious 
projects.  While this certainly left me with a critical impression of carbon trading, I also 
knew I had very little knowledge of this policy and thus would have to conduct much 
more research before I could provide much by way of critical perspective. 
 Just after I returned from Brazil the Kyoto Protocol came into force and its Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) ushered in a new global carbon market.  On 13 April 
2005 the Canadian government released Project Green; its plan to meet its Kyoto targets 
and this included a large emphasis on domestic and international carbon trading (and no 
mention of carbon taxes.)  By this time I had realized it was time to focus on trading as a) 
it was clearly the preferred response to the threat posed by climate change; and b) any 
future advocacy of carbon taxes would have to be grounded in a critique of carbon 
trading.  Having already familiarized myself with the economic and policy argument 
around trading, the knowledge gap remaining to be filled seemed best addressed by 
visiting actual CDM projects and investigating their climatic benefits on the ground. 
The opportunity aspect of this research came out of a class I took with Dr. Patrick 
Bond who visited York in 2003/2004.  I wrote a term paper on climate activism for Dr. 
Bond and in his praise for my work he urged me to consider visiting South Africa to learn 
of all the climate change activism happening there, in particular around a CDM project in 
Durban.  At that time I did not consider this invitation all that seriously as I failed to 
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make a connection between activism in South Africa and Canadian climate change 
policy.  In February 2005 I wrote a brief op-ed letter in The Toronto Star urging Canada 
to focus on reducing its own emissions rather than relying on carbon trading.  After 
emailing the letter to Patrick he reiterated his invitation to come to South Africa.  By this 
time I could make the connection between our climate change policy (relying on CDM 
credits) and South African activism (against these same projects) and thus I accepted the 
invitation to be a Visiting Scholar at the Centre for Civil Society at the University of 
KwaZulu-Natal in Durban. 
This major research paper is the culmination of my research on the South African 
carbon market but it also fits in nicely with my Plan of Study, which I titled “Rethinking 
Canadian Climate Change Policy.”  A major focus of my plan remains carbon taxes and 
ecological fiscal reform, but after conducting this research I am in a much better position 
to advocate this policy, both on its own strengths, but also on the weaknesses of the status 
quo.  The time has indeed come for a collective “rethink” of our approach to climate 
change policy in this country.  This rethink should not just be extended to the major 
political parties who all seem to favour trading in some form or another but also the 
major ENGOs, business groups, academics, and activists involved in the climate struggle.  
While the critique of carbon trading in this paper can hopefully make a contribution to 
such a discussion, perhaps its greatest contribution could be to get people thinking about 
the international effects of our domestic policy choices and the need to expand the 
conversation to those effected parties.  This paper is but a humble attempt to tell some of 
these stories but in the future it is my hope that such voices can be heard from directly.  
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Introduction 
With climate change posing one of the gravest threats to humanity in the 21st Century, 
and free market economics potentially being our most powerful ethos, it is little wonder 
that so much effort has gone into making the latter a solution to the former. The result of 
these efforts in known as carbon trading: rather than forcing countries or firms to reduce 
their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, participants in a ‘carbon market’ are given a 
reduction target that they can meet either through their own reductions or by purchasing 
“carbon credits” from countries/firms that reduce beyond their target level.  Prior to 1997, 
carbon trading did not exist per se, but there were forms of other emissions trading. These 
were usually restricted to a single pollutant (e.g. sulphur dioxide) in a single region (e.g. 
the United States.)  However, since the advent of the Kyoto Protocol (“Kyoto”) the 
carbon market now exists on a global level and includes all six greenhouse gases. The 
vast majority of carbon market activity falls under the auspices of Article 12 of Kyoto, 
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM.)  The CDM is the mechanism whereby 
developed countries (Annex 1) receive certified emission reductions (CERs) for 
investments in projects that reduce or sequester GHG emissions in developing countries.   
Since the Kyoto Protocol came into force on 16 February 2005, there has been a 
massive increase in the activity of the global carbon market.  According to the World 
Bank, there was an estimated $25 billion worth of transactions in global carbon markets 
worldwide in 2006.1 As of 14 March 2007, a total of 158 projects have been verified and 
registered with the Executive Board of the CDM (EB/CDM) and 138 of these are 
                                                 
1 Karen Capoor and Phillippe Ambrosi “State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2006” (Washington, DC: 
Prototype Carbon Fund of the World Bank) 2006 at 7 
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currently issuing Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs).2  According to the UNEP, 
there are another 1742 projects worldwide in the “pipeline” meaning some stage of 
development and/or approval of their sustainable development indicators and 
methodologies by their host country’s Designated National Authority (DNA) and 
Designated Operational Entity (DOE), respectively.3   
In spite of the CDM’s status as the key international policy response to the 
climate crisis, it is very difficult to find any in-depth analyses of a host country’s carbon 
market.  This paper will begin to fill this void by studying in detail the ways in which the 
carbon market has developed in South Africa and what opportunities social actors have to 
engage in this issue and shape climate policy in favourable ways. 
 There are a number of reasons why South Africa was chosen for this case study.  
As the only African country with any serious project development, the success or failure 
of the CDM in South Africa will have enormous implications for the carbon market on 
the rest of the continent.  Secondly, with nearly two dozen projects in various stages of 
development, South Africa’s variety of methodologies and project developers is 
relatively representational of the global carbon market even though it has fewer projects 
than some other countries.  This allows a relatively small sample size of South African 
projects to better represent overall trends in the global carbon market.  Finally, South 
Africa’s rich history of social mobilizations, especially during the Apartheid era, provides 
a unique context to study the opportunities for social actors to influence carbon trading 
projects and policy in a host country. 
                                                 
2 Fenhann, Jørgen UNEP Risø Centre, “CDM Project Pipeline” updated 14-03-07, online: 
www.cd4cdm.org  
3 Ibid. 
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 The methodology employed in this study is strongly influenced by Michael 
Buroway’s “Extended Case Method,” whereby the researcher immerses him or herself in 
the field to observe personally the interactions of the various parties and to maximize 
opportunities for uncovering primary sources.4  Thus in the course of this research 
project, eleven weeks were spent in South Africa examining primary source materials, 
conducting over two dozen interviews with participants in the carbon markets, and doing 
a number of site visits to CDM projects.  
 The results of this research will be presented in the next four chapters.  Chapter 
One provides further background and critical perspectives on carbon trading and the 
CDM more generally.  Chapter Two examines how the carbon market has developed in 
South Africa through four separate project case studies.  Chapter Three considers the 
ability of governance structures to provide oversight of this market.   Chapter Four looks 
at how social actors are organized around this market and what influence they have on its 
shape.  The paper concludes with some ideas for improving the carbon market in South 
Africa as well as some suggestions for how we can apply the lessons learned from this 
experience for considering new directions in combating climate change.   
Through this analysis, it will be shown that the South African carbon market 
appears to be mired in a fundamental incompatibility between community-supported 
projects with real sustainable development benefits and the projects seen as financially 
viable by investors, in part because they disregard the needs of local communities and 
often do little to help prevent the impending climate crisis. 
                                                 
4 Michael Burawoy, “The Extended Case Method,” Sociological Theory Vol. 16, No. 1 (March 1998): 8. 
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Chapter One: The CDM and its Critics 
This chapter is primarily intended to provide some background context for audiences 
with little to no knowledge of carbon trading or international climate policy.  This will be 
done through a brief overview of the history of this idea, a review of some legal 
terminology and processes, current market trends, and a review of some of the key 
critiques of this approach to fighting climate change.  Those readers with more of a 
background in this area should feel free to skim this chapter or skip it altogether.  
1.1. A Brief History of Carbon Trading 
The idea of carbon trading is an application of a larger concept of emissions trading. The 
simplest definition of emissions trading is the trading of emissions rights in a market with 
the intention to achieve an overall reduction of pollution at the lowest total cost. 
Therefore the term “emissions trading” is something of a misnomer as it actually 
“emissions rights” that are traded and not emissions themselves.  An emissions right is a 
right to emit a defined quantity of a certain substance during a fixed period of time.5  The 
term carbon trading then can be defined as a form of trading in rights to emit carbon 
dioxide or greenhouse gases in its equivalent (CO2e). 
The intellectual origins of emissions trading can be traced back to a little-known 
publication from 1968 entitled, “Pollution, Property, and Prices” by Canadian economist 
                                                 
5 There has been a very storied debate on the nature of emissions rights both as a practical and theoretical 
concept. The Marrakech Accords (the rule book for emissions trading in Kyoto) specifically states that the 
Kyoto Protocol has “not created or bestowed any right, title or entitlement to emissions of any kind on 
Parties included in Annex I”( Preamble 2/cmp.1 and preamble decision 15/cp7)  However, some legal 
theorists dispute this fact (see: Cole, Daniel H. “Clearing the air: four propositions about property rights 
and environmental protection” 10 Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum, 103 (Fall 1999) and Stewart, 
Richard. “Privprop, Regprop, and Beyond”, 13 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 93 (1990)) 
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John Dales.6 This was also the same year that Garrett Hardin penned the much more 
famous essay, “The Tragedy of the Commons.”  Like Hardin, Dales believed that natural 
resources in their unrestricted common property form would face tragic overexploitation 
by people acting in their rational self-interest.7  Yet Dales went much further than Hardin 
in his solution to this problem.  Dales proposed to control water pollution by setting a 
total quota of allowable waste for each waterway and then set up a “market” in equivalent 
“pollution rights” to firms to discharge pollutants up to this level.8  These rights, referred 
to as “transferable property rights…for the disposal of wastes” would be sold to firms and 
then they could trade them amongst themselves.9  The more efficient firms would make 
the larger pollution reductions and then sell their excess credits to less efficient firms, 
thereby guaranteeing a reduction of overall pollution at the lowest social cost. 
Though Dales’ proposal took a backseat to the command and control approach to 
environmental policy during the 1970s, his idea was applied in an ad hoc basis through a 
series of proposal and pilot projects by the Environmental Protection Agency in the 
United States.  Over the years proponents of pollution trading – notably the emerging 
self-described “free-market environmentalists” – found a growing audience for Dales’ 
logic about the greater efficiency in trading, and added claims of lower administrative 
costs and greater incentives for innovation.  In 1990 the United States Congress amended 
the Clean Air Act in 1990 to create the world’s first national emissions-trading scheme in 
sulphur dioxide, the main pollutant behind acid rain.  The new Clean Air Act also allowed 
the formation of regional emissions trading markets, which helped create the RECLAIM 
                                                 
6 John Dales  Pollution, Property and Prices: An Essay in Policy-Making and Economics (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1968) 
7 Hardin, Garrett.  “The Tragedy of the Commons” 162 Science 1243 (1968) 
8 Dales, Supra note 6 at 81 
9 Ibid at 85 
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(REgional CLean Air Incentives Market) scheme around the Los Angeles basin.10  
America’s experience with emissions trading played a significant role in the inclusion of 
trading in the Kyoto Protocol, which was done so in large part at America’s insistence. 
1.2. Carbon Trading and the Kyoto Protocol 
The inclusion of emissions trading in the Kyoto Protocol was one of the most contentious 
issues during the negotiations.  According to Michael Grubb, “International emissions 
trading was seen as the most efficient and direct route to the international flexibility 
sought by the United States and other JUSSCANNZ11 countries – and was viewed with 
suspicion by most of the rest of the world.  It was to become the crux on which, from 
some perspectives, Kyoto stood – and nearly fell.”12  Leading the opposition to trading 
were many environmental NGOs (ENGOs) and the EU, both of whom favoured absolute 
emission reduction targets and feared that allowing trading would avoid necessary 
domestic action and potentially have much less climatic benefits.  In the end, proponents 
of trading prevailed and the final text of the Protocol included three “flexibility 
mechanisms” around trading.  Yet the opposition of the ENGOs and the EU also ensured 
the text also included provisions that the use of flexibility mechanisms be “supplemental” 
to domestic action and, in some instances, contribute to a host country’s sustainable 
development.  
To understand the emissions trading provisions of the Kyoto Protocol it is first 
necessary to recognize the different forms of emissions trading that exist.  There are 
                                                 
10 For more on RECLAIM please visit: www.aqmd.gov/reclaim/reclaim.html For those looking for a more 
critical analysis please see: Drury, Richard et al. “Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los 
Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy” 9 Duke Env L & Pol'y F 231 (Spring, 1999) 
11 JUSSCANNZ is a group coalition of the non-EU developed countries including Japan, the US, 
Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Norway and New Zealand.  
12 Grubb, M. with Vrolijk, C. and Brack, D. The Kyoto Protocol: A Guide and Assessment (The Royal 
Institute of International Affairs: London, 1999) at 90 
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principally two such forms: the more popular cap-and-trade system and a baseline-and-
credit system.  In the former, the total amount of emissions that may be emitted during a 
certain period of time is capped by a competent authority.  Companies that are subject to 
the cap are then allocated a certain amount of pollution rights they can emit.  In some 
cases this is done through an auction of the rights, but more commonly they are provided 
freely based on historical levels of emissions, known as grandfathering. Under a baseline-
and-credit system, companies do not receive allocations.  Instead a baseline for the level 
of emissions is established.  Entities that reduce their emissions with respect to the 
baseline are given credits for the difference between their actual emissions and the 
baseline and then can retain these credits for future compliance periods or trade them.  In 
both cases, companies that exceed their limits must purchase credits from those who 
don’t or pay a fine, ideally equivalent to the cost of compliance if economically efficient. 
The Kyoto Protocol is a hybrid of these two systems: industrialized countries 
(listed in Annex I of the Protocol and referred to as such) participate in emissions trading 
through a cap-and-trade system. Each country has been assigned a Quantified Emission 
Limitation and Reduction Commitment (QELRC), which can be found in Annex B of the 
Protocol.  A Party’s QELRC is the percentage of its 1990 baseline that it is allowed to 
emit per year; the total or cap a Party is permitted to emit is five times the QELRC which 
corresponds to the length of the first commitment period: 2008 to 2012.13  Parties that 
exceed their cap may trade their excess Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) with other 
Annex I countries under Article 17 of the Protocol.   Developing countries (not listed in 
Annex 1) may also participate in emissions trading using Kyoto’s second trading system, 
The baseline in this case is a business-as-usual scenario, as developing countries do not 
                                                 
13 The Kyoto Protocol at Article 3.7 online: unfccc.int/Kyoto_protocol  
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have emissions reductions targets under the Protocol.  Thus countries, or entities they 
authorize, can earn emissions credits for emissions reductions generation through project-
based activities.  These credits are called certified emission reductions (CERs), and are 
traded through Kyoto’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM.)  Third, countries with 
economies in transition (EIT) may participate in both forms of trading.  These Parties 
have assigned amounts under the Protocol and so can trade AAUs.   In addition, they may 
participate in project-based activities with other Annex I countries to earn emissions 
credits, known as Joint Implementation (JI) under Article 6 of Kyoto. 
Like Emissions Trading in Article 17, Joint Implementation has thus far not 
played a significant role in the international carbon market.  This is due to a number of 
factors, both political and economic.  Suffice it to say that political concerns over “hot 
air” and greater capacity and returns in countries like China and India over countries in 
the former Soviet bloc are the major barriers. With these other flexibility mechanisms 
playing minimal roles, the global carbon market is thus almost entirely made up of 
transactions under Article 12 of Kyoto, the Clean Development Mechanism.  Prior to 
analyzing the four CDM projects in this paper it is first necessary to further review the 
CDM’s project cycle and governance institutions, the various requirements projects must 
meet, and the current CDM market trends.  
1.3. The CDM Project Cycle 
The CDM project cycle can be broken up into five stages: Design, Validation & 
Registration, Monitoring, Verification & Certification, and Issuance. The first step for all 
project participants, who may be government or private sector entities, is to develop a 
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project proposal. Specifically, they must complete the Project Design Document (PDD),14 
the basis upon which approval for the project will be granted.  In the second stage, the 
PDD is submitted to a Designated Operational Entity (DOE) for validation and 
registration.  A DOE is a private sector entity charged with helping validated projects and 
has been accredited by the EB/CDM.  At this stage, the DOE will review the PDD to 
consider whether the project’s methodology is in line with approved methodologies or 
seek approval from the EB for a new methodology.  The DOE will also ensure that the 
potential emissions reductions are additional, the baseline scenarios are accurate, and that 
the participation requirements are met.  The DOE must make the PDD available for 
public comment for 30 days.  Based on those comments and the other information 
available, the DOE will decide whether the project is valid and make its report publicly 
available before submitting it to the EB. 
Prior to submitting its report, the DOE must have received a letter of approval 
from the host country’s Designated National Authority (DNA).  Unlike the DOEs, DNAs 
are public sector bodies (usually housed in an environment, energy, or foreign affairs 
department) that play an oversight role to ensure projects developed in their country have 
voluntary participants and contribute to the country’s sustainable development.  How 
countries choose to access sustainable development is left to their prerogative (see  
discussion on sustainable development criteria below.)   Most DNAs conduct their 
assessment using a project’s PDD, yet some require additional documentation.  Some 
DNAs also offer an initial screening of projects based on an early version of the PDD 
                                                 
14 For further information on what must be included in a PDD, please see: 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Reference/PDDs_Forms/PDDs/ 
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known as a Project Identification Note (PIN).15  The purpose of the initial screening is to 
flag any issues at an early stage that may prevent the final project from being approved.  
Project developers may receive a letter of no objection from the DNA upon successful 
completion of the screening, which can be of assistance in securing project funding.  
Once a project has the full approval of the DNA and DOE, it will be submitted to 
the EB/CDM for registration of the project.  Registration is automatic 8 weeks after 
receipt by the EB/CDM provided that a Party involved with the project or at least three 
members have not requested a review.16  There have been very few instances of review 
requests by the EB/CDM, due in part to their limited capacity with only twelve full-time 
board members and previous funding shortfalls. 
Following registration, the final stage is for project participants to monitor the 
project through its implementation phase and collect data for measuring the project 
baseline and the GHG reductions that were achieved. The monitoring report will be used 
by the DOE to help it verify the amount of GHG reductions actually produced by the 
project.  Once the DOE has determined this amount, it will request that the EB/CDM 
issue CERs for the emissions reductions.  The EB/CDM then has 15 days to do so unless 
a Party involved with the project or at least three members of the EB/CDM have 
requested a review.  
1.4. Sustainable Development Criterion 
To ensure the CDM would help put developing countries on a cleaner path to 
development, the parties included a requirement in Kyoto that all projects must contribute 
                                                 
15 A PIN provides an overview of the project, but does not contain the level of detail of a PDD.  The PIN 
concept was developed by the World Bank and is part of its project cycle for providing financing to CDM 
projects.  A PIN, unlike the PDD, is not an official document of the UNFCCC.   
16 The Marrakech Accords (3/cmp1) at para 41 
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to a host country’s sustainable development.  However, a precise definition of sustainable 
development is not included in the Protocol nor in the subsequent modalities and 
procedures developed for the CDM.  During UN negotiations, many attempts were made 
by ENGOS and some parties in the EU to adopt international criteria for sustainable 
development but these efforts ultimately failed as most countries favoured leaving the 
definition to each individual host country.17   
This decision to avoid universal indicators of sustainable development in CDM 
projects has been criticized by a number of stakeholders for numerous reasons.18  At the 
most basic level the problem is that developing countries are competing for a share of the 
CDM market so there is an incentive for them to adopt more lenient standards to attract 
more investors.  This is the “race to the bottom” thesis and is by no means unique to the 
CDM.  However, what makes it especially applicable to the carbon market is the 
acknowledgment by actors on various sides of this debate that there is a fundamental 
trade-off between achieving the most cost-effective GHG reductions in a project and 
making a meaningful contribution to the host country’s sustainable development.   The 
market failure in this case is the inability of the market to place any value or premium on 
good projects over poorer projects in terms of their sustainable development contribution.  
One attempt at addressing this problem has been the formation of the “CDM Gold 
Standard”; an NGO-driven initiative to adopt universal criteria for economic, social, and 
environmental sustainability that projects can apply for and by certified as such.19  While 
                                                 
17 Kelly and Helme (2000). Ensuring CDM Project Compatibility with Sustainable Development Goals, 
Center for Clean Air Policy.   
18 See Holm Oslen, K., undated, The Clean Development Mechanism’s Contribution to Susntainable 
Development: A review of the literature, Capacity Development for the CDM (CD4CDM), UNEP Risø 
Centre. Avaliable at http://www.cd4cdm.org/Publications/CDM&SustainDevelop_literature.pdf  
19 For additional information on the CDM Gold Standard please see: www.cdmgoldstandard.org 
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evidence on what sort of a premium investors will pay for Gold Standard projects over 
regular projects in the CDM market is unclear, some of these projects have done rather 
well in the voluntary offset market, whose participants tend to be much more concerned 
about sustainable development.  To investigate how much difference the “Gold Standard” 
label makes to these projects two of them were investigated in South Africa and will be 
discussed in much great detail later in this paper. 
A final issue regarding sustainable development and the CDM is the lack of any 
formal requirement to monitor the sustainable development benefits claimed in the latter 
stages of the project cycle, as opposed to requirements for baselines and additionality.20  
This point has been raised in the international arena before and a number of host 
countries have advocated including sustainable development in the monitoring plan.21  
1.5. Additionality Considerations 
One of the most contentious issues within the carbon market and least understood outside 
it is the additionality requirement.  For a project to achieve a net reduction in emissions it 
must occur absent the status quo.  For example, if a Factory A shuts down for economic 
reasons unrelated to a desire to mitigate climate change, it should not be able to sell the 
emissions it would have produced in the future had it stayed open to Factory B.  If this 
were allowed to happen, the climate would not benefit as the Factory B would be allowed 
to continue to pollute, or potentially even increase its emissions.  The additionality 
requirement attempts to prevent this scenario, though its precise definition in the 
international rules on CDM is somewhat ambiguous: “A CDM project activity is 
                                                 
20 3/cmp1, supra note 16 at para. 53 
21 For example, see Cambodia’s project approval requirements in  Institute for Global Environmental 
Strategies (eds) CDM Country Guide for Cambodia (2005), 2nd edition, IGES: Japan.  Available at 
http://www.cd4cdm.org/Publications/CDM&SustainDevelop_literature.pdf at 48. 
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additional if anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases by sources are reduced below 
those that would have occurred in the absence of the registered CDM project activity.”22   
In trying to interpret this language, a dispute has arisen around the difference 
between environmental and project additionality.  All agree that emissions must be lower 
than the baseline to qualify (environmental additionality), but some argue that the project 
itself must be additional (project additionality).23  If the project would have occurred 
regardless of the CDM credits then the ‘reductions’ are actually part of the business-as-
usual baseline and not additional. (Much like the first example of the factory closing and 
selling the emissions that would have happened had it stayed open.)  On the other hand, if 
it is carbon finance that makes a project viable than the ongoing pollution of the party 
purchasing the credits is truly being offset by reductions elsewhere. The Executive Board 
of the CDM, has adopted the stricter definition of project and environmental 
additionality, much to the consternation of business groups who see it as a major barrier 
to carbon investment.24  This approach has also been criticized for its potential to create 
perverse policy incentives, namely that developing countries will not impose regulations 
on GHG emission reductions for fear that this would hinder CDM project activity in their 
countries.25  The EB/CDM has clarified that government policies to promote low-GHG 
emitting practices need not be considered as part of a project’s baseline, however it is 
                                                 
22 3/cmp1, supra note 16 at para. 43 
23 Sutter, C. (2003) Sustainability Check-Up for CDM Projects: How to assess the sustainability of 
international projects under the Kyoto Protocol. (Wissenschaftlicher Verlag: Berlin) at 58-63 
24 Ibid. at 59. 
25 Figueres, C. (2006) “Sectoral CDM: Opening the CDM to the Yet Unrealized Goal of Sustainable 
Development” McGill International Journal of Sustainable Development Law and Policy 2:1, 5-25 at 12-
13. 
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unclear as to their view of legislation requiring such activities.26  As of November 2006 
this issue has yet to be resolved to the satisfaction of the parties involved. 
1.6. Supplemental Interpretations 
In addition to additionality and sustainable development requirements on the host 
countries, there is a third important requirement in the carbon market that applies to the 
purchasers of carbon credits.  This the requirement that the acquisition of CERs (or 
credits for Joint Implementation and Emissions Trading) must be “supplemental” to 
domestic action. According to the language of Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol: “Any 
such [carbon] trading shall be supplemental to domestic actions for the purpose of 
meeting quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under that Article.”27  
There have been a number of attempts to defined what “supplemental” means in 
the context of trading of emissions.  Unfortunately no agreement on this has been reached 
to date. 28  In international law, the Marrakech Accords define supplemental to domestic 
action to mean that “domestic action shall thus constitute a significant element of the 
effort made by each Party included in Annex I…” A better attempt to quantify this is 
found in the European Union’s Linking Directive, which dictates that credits obtained 
from CDM or JI activities should be capped as a percentage of the allocation of 
allowances to each country participating in the scheme.29  Yet much like the ambiguity in 
                                                 
26 Sales, R. and Kerlakian Sabbag, B. (2006) Environmental Requirements and Additionality Under the 
Clean Development Mechanism: A Legal Review Under the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and the 
Brazilian Legal Framework on Climate Change. [forthcoming] 
27 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 13 at Art. 17, emphasis added. 
28 For more on the efforts to define “supplemental” please see Grubb, M. with Vrolijk, C. and Brack, D. 
The Kyoto Protocol: A Guide and Assessment (The Royal Institute of International Affairs: London, 1999) 
at 217-224.   
29 Article 10 of DIRECTIVE 2004/101/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL of 27 October 2004 amending Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas 
emission allowance trading within the Community, in respect of the Kyoto Protocol’s project mechanisms 
 - 23 -
the Kyoto Protocol, the Linking Directive allows Member States to determine the level of 
the cap.  This freedom has been liberally interpreted in some countries, such as the 
Netherlands who has been one of the most active in emissions trading markets.  
According to the Prototype Carbon Fund, the Dutch government decided in 2000 to make 
available a budget to buy 50 percent of its Kyoto target as credits from JI and CDM.30  
This target equals 100 million tons of carbon dioxide equivalent.31  Although the 
Conservative government under Stephan Harper has ruled out purchasing any sort of 
international carbon credits, in 2005 the Liberal government in Canada released Project 
Green, a plan to meet their Kyoto targets, nearly half of which (115 MT of CO2e) was 
allocated in a Climate Fund that could be used to purchase CDM/JI credits.   
Thus countries seem content to interpret “supplemental” as only using carbon 
credits, CDM or otherwise, to met up to 50% of their reduction target and achieve the rest 
through domestic action.  With a number of countries, including Canada, being far off 
their Kyoto target there seems to be little appetite among ENGOs and climate activists to 
argue whether supplemental action should be interpreted so generously.  However, with 
the post-2012 carbon trading regime yet to be negotiated, this issue could resurface in the 
coming years. 
1.7. Carbon Market Trends 
With the process of validation now established and some of the relevant institutions 
explained, let us turn our attention to how the global carbon market has developed since 
Kyoto.  The first thing to note is the large role played by Northern firms and consultants 
who are able to provide a certain level of capacity and expertise that might not be as 
                                                 
30 Prototype Carbon Fund.  “PCF Annual Report 2004” (Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2006) at 16 
31 Grub, supra note 28 at 9 
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readily accessible in Southern countries.  Another example of this has been the 
prominence of the World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF.)  In partnership with 6 
governments and 17 companies plus a budget of US $180 million, the PCF describes 
itself as “a leader in the creation of a carbon market to help deal with the threat posed by 
climate change.”32 As the single largest purchaser of CERs, as of September 2006 the 
PCF had 32 projects in development with a total CER value potential of US$165 
million.33   
 A second noteworthy trend is that the market is heavily concentrated in large 
middle income countries led by India, China, and Brazil.  The PCF admits “this 
concentration of CDM flows towards large middle-income countries is consistent with 
the current direction of Foreign Direct Investment.”34 By contrast poorer countries, 
especially in Africa, have almost entirely been left behind.  As of September 2006, South 
Africa and Morocco were the only countries on the continent to have validated a CDM 
project.  According to the PCF, “This under-representation of Africa raises deep concerns 
about the overall equity of the distribution of the CDM market, as the vast majority of 
African countries have not, for the moment, been able to pick up even one first deal.”35  
With the 12th Conference of the Parties (COP12) held in Nairobi, Kenya in November 
2006 – the first time a COP has been held in sub-Saharan Africa – the distribution of the 
CDM was a key topic of discussion.  While there have been commitments of some parties 
to help develop on the ground capacity, including regional DNAs rather than national 
                                                 
32 PCF, supra note 30 at 7 
33 Prototype Carbon Fund website: www.carbonfinance.org 
34 Prototype Carbon Fund. “Carbon Market Trends 2005” (Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2005) at 
25  
35 PCF, supra note 34 at 25  
 - 25 -
ones, the under-representation of African countries in the CDM may continue to be an 
issue for years to come. 
 The other major trend in the carbon market has been the enormous profitability of 
non-carbon related projects.  While renewable energy projects (which offset CO2 
emissions) make up nearly 58% of the total number of projects, they account for only 
15% of the total number of CERs that have been issued.36  By contrast, projects abating 
nitrogen (N20) and hydroflorocarbons (HFC23) are less than 2% of the overall number of 
projects, yet make up 74% of the CERs issued to date by project sector.37  These projects 
are known as “low-hanging fruit” since their high returns mean they are the first to be 
picked by investors.  The reason is that HFC23 has up to 14,000 times the potency of 
CO2 and since credits are in CO2 equivalent (CO2e) a relatively small capture of HFC23 
can bring an enormous windfall of credits.  According to the PCF, the large amount of 
non-CO2 projects in the carbon market has meant that “traditional energy efficiency or 
fuel switching projects, which were initially expected to represent the bulk of the CDM, 
account for less than 5% [of it now.]”38  
1.8. The CDM and Climate Justice 
In concert with the growth of carbon market has been a growing body of literature critical 
of carbon trading.  Activists and academics have taken issue with a number of aspects of 
carbon trading: legal minds take issue with the property regime it creates in the air,39 
                                                 
36 Fenhann, supra note 2  
37 PCF, supra note 34 at 27 
38 Ibid. at 5 
39 See: Torres, Gerald “Seventh Annual Lloyd K. Garrison Lecture on Environmental Law: Who Owns the 
Sky?” 19 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 515 
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biologists note the dubious science around carbon sinks40, and economists debunk myths 
of greater innovation and costs savings.41  Respecting these approaches, I will just briefly 
focus on a different critique, that of climate justice.  The basic idea of climate justice is 
that the richest persons and countries have caused this problem through their profligate 
use of fossil fuels while poorer countries and persons are most vulnerable to its effects. 
To add empirical evidence to the basic contention of the climate justice approach, in 1990 
– the base year for the Kyoto Protocol – industrialized countries were responsible for 
75% of all CO2 emissions that year and 88% of the emissions that had previously caused 
global warming.42  More recently, in 2003 the US and the EU were alone responsible for 
45% of all global CO2 emissions, even though they only had 10% of the world’s 
population.43  As to the effect of these emissions, a September 2005 study by the research 
group System for Research Analysis and Training revaled "Poor developing countries are 
least developed to adapt to climate change, although most of them play and certainly will 
continue to play an insignificant role in causing it."44  The hardest hit region, according to 
the study will be Africa where extreme weather patterns will trigger droughtss and 
deepening food shortages since most people rely on rain-fed crops to survive.  "Climate 
change will exacerbate hunger, which now affects about 50 percent of our population," 
the study’s lead author was quoted, "Above all, climate change will worsen poverty on 
the continent."45  Even within wealthier countries, it is often the poorest people who are 
                                                 
40 See: Cathleen Fogel “Biotic Carbon Sequestration and the Kyoto Protocol: the Construction of Global 
Knowledge by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change” (forthcoming) 
41 See: Ian Parry.“Fiscal Interactions and the Case for Carbon Taxes over Grandfathered Carbon Permits” 
(Washington, DC: Resources for the Future) October 2003 
42 Tom Athanaisou.  “EcoEquity Observer” Downloaded from http://ecoequity.org/ceo/ceo_6_2.htm 
43 Heidi Bachram et al “A new form of colonialism: emissions trading” unpublished document. 2004. 
44 Reuters News Service. “Climate change hurts Africa most, scientists say” (22 September 2005) 
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45 Reuters News Service, Ibid. 
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most effected by this problem, as evidenced by the struggles of the Canadian Inuit to 
preserve their traditional lifestyle in the face of severe climatic changes in the Artic. 
Accepting these basic premises around climate change and inequality, climate 
justice activists often reject carbon trading as a solution to the climate crisis because it is 
more likely to further exacerbate inequalities than address them.  On the global level, by 
allowing Annex 1 countries to purchase emissions credits rather than force them to 
reduce their own emissions, carbon trading does little to address the over-exploitation of 
the atmosphere as a carbon dump by the rich at the expense of the poor.  On the ground 
level, as this paper will now show, is often the case that the CDM projects themselves can 
exacerbate local inequalities as fence-line communities are marginalized from the process 
and receive little benefit from the projects, or worse further detriment. 
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2. Chapter Two: South African CDM Project Case Studies 
Prior to discussing the four specific CDM projects that this chapter will focus on, it is 
first necessary to provide greater context as to the development of the carbon market 
throughout South Africa.  This context will be governed by three general questions: what 
types of projects are being developed, who is developing them, and how the four projects 
were chosen for this study.  
As of September 2005, only one South African CDM project has been approved 
by the CDM Executive Board; the Kuyasa low-cost urban housing energy upgrade 
project in Khayelitsha, outside of Cape Town (see section 2.4 for a discussion of this 
project.)  Furthermore, another two projects are currently at the validation stage of the 
EB; the Durban landfill gas projects at the Mariannhill and La Mercy sites (the project 
developers have held back on the Bisasar Road site, which is discussed in the next 
section) as well as a small scale hydro project at Bethleham Falls in the Free State.  As to 
the earlier stages of the project cycle, there are another eight or so projects that have 
submitted either a Project Design Document or a Project Identification Note to the 
Designated National Authority.  Among these projects are a variety of methodologies 
being used to reduce emissions: four are fuel switching, three are methane capture, three 
are small-scale renewables (two hydro projects and one solar energy project), and two 
biogas projects.  In addition to the projects that have submitted documentation, there are a 
number of other CDM projects “in the pipeline” (read: various stages of development 
 - 29 -
prior to the official validation cycle.)  These future projects being discussed generally fall 
into just two categories: industrial fuel switching and municipal landfill gas capture.46 
 In terms of who is developing these projects, the private sector is out front with 
the majority of them, but there continues to be very visible project development at the 
municipal level and this is projected to continue, especially in the area of landfill gas 
capture.  What unites both the private and public sector developers is their almost 
universal reliance on outside consultants.  The need for these consultants is rooted in the 
expertise required for the complex validation process that is rarely found in the private 
firms doing the projects and never found in the municipalities.  These consultants fall into 
a number of categories: first there are the foreign private experts such as Ecosecurities or 
the World Bank’s PCF that charge high commissions for taking projects from 
identification and feasibility studies straight through the approval process.  Secondly, 
there are domestic private consultants, such at the Palma Development Group in 
Johannesburg.  Finally, there are non-profit, foreign-funded consultants such as South 
South North (SSN) and PACE (Promoting Access to Carbon Equity) in Cape Town and 
the CBLA (Capacity Building, Leadership, and Action) in Johannesburg.   
The involvement of these non-profit groups in the CDM market poses some 
interesting questions about the use of official development aid and carbon credits.  
According to the Marrakech Accord on the CDM, “public funding for clean development 
mechanism projects from Parties in Annex I is not to result in the diversion of official 
development assistance.”47  This requirement was promoted by developing countries to 
ensure the CDM did not create a zero-sum trade-off with aid in areas such as health and 
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47 UNFCCC  “Modalities and Procedures for the Clean Development Mechanism” (Marrakech, Morocco: 
2003) at paragraph 44 
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education dropping off as more foreign investments came into the energy sector.  
However, it has become somewhat controversial as it has been interpreted in a variety of 
ways by Annex I countries.  For example, the Canadian government has given strict 
instructions to CBLA that it is not to spend any of its budget writing PDDs or any other 
activities tied to actively bringing projects to market.48  This leaves CBLA with helping 
its clients identify opportunities to reduce emissions through feasibility studies and advise 
them on the potential of the CDM to help cover some or all of the costs of such efforts.  
This is largely the position the United Kingdom takes with PACE as well, preventing 
them from doing PDDs and any verification.49  However, the Dutch government has 
taken a very different position with their funding of SSN.  This organization has been 
around longer than any other non-profit consultants having formed in 1999 to promote 
indicators for the sustainable development criteria of the CDM.  Since that time however, 
their mandate has morphed to now include, “Design, implementation and transaction of 
CDM pilot projects.”50 In practice this means that they are basically in the driver’s seat 
throughout the project development planning the projects, writing the PDDs, and 
maintaining active involvement post-verification.  This has fostered a widely-held 
perception throughout actors in the CDM market that SSN is “more a private company 
than an NGO” and that the Dutch government is violating the Marrakech Accord.51 As an 
aside, the Dutch government’s aggressive use of official development aid (ODA) with 
SSN in nothing new: they also funded the entire start-up costs for the DNA, are the 
largest investor in the PCF, and are the largest single buyer of CERs with 16% of the total 
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market.52  It is safe to say that the global carbon market, and in South Africa especially, 
would look very different without such active involvement by the Netherlands.  
A final point of context necessary before discussing the project case studies is to 
explain why they were chosen as representative of the South African carbon market.  
Briefly, the projects are Durban Solid Waste’s landfill gas capture, Sasol’s fuel 
switching, Bellville’s landfill gas capture, and Kuyasa’s low-income housing energy 
upgrade.  Collectively these projects represent the three most popular methodologies, are 
located in three entirely separate areas of South Africa, are all in different stages of 
development and verification, and are a good mix of the diversity of project developers.  
Having said this, these projects are not intended to give a complete picture of all the 
trends in South Africa’s carbon market.  With a dozen projects in the validation cycle and  
more on the way, such an undertaking is outside the scope of this paper.  Yet through 
these projects some general observations can safely be made about South Africa’s carbon 
market and its ability to further the global struggle against climate change. 
2.1. Landfill Gas Capture in Durban 
Any serious discussion of the CDM in Africa should begin with the landfill gas capture 
project in Durban.  This was the first CDM project on the continent, being initially 
proposed in 2002 when the country hosted the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development.  It also received US$15 million from the World Bank’s Prototype Carbon 
Fund in start-up capital, one of the first projects the PCF ever supported.  Finally, with 
the possible exception of the Plantar sinks project in Brazil, this is the most controversial 
                                                 
52 PCF, supra note 30 at 20-21 
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CDM project to date and has easily garnered the most attention of international activists 
and media.53 
 On the face of it, the Durban Solid Waste (DSW) project seems simple enough: at 
three landfill sites across the city – Bisasar Road, La Mercy, and Mariannhill – wells are 
drilled to capture methane gas that would otherwise be released into the atmosphere as a 
greenhouse gas twenty-one times more potent than CO2.  Currently landfill gas is 
captured and flared at the Bisasar Road and Marianhill landfill, but this is only about 
7.4% of the potential gas that could be captured.54  The proposed project plans to 
substantially increase the efficiency of the gas capture up to a high of 83% in 2012, and 
dropping to about 45% collection efficiency over the twenty-one year life of the project.55  
Once the gas has been captured it will be put into electricity generators for use by 
industrial consumers, thus offsetting coal emissions from the electricity these industries 
would have used normally.  Had this project got underway in 2004 it was claimed that it 
would offset a total of nearly 2 million tones of CO2 equivalent (CO2e) by 2010.56   
This project is claimed to be additional since it is capturing methane gas well 
beyond levels proposed by the regulations and the capacity of local officials, plus local 
industries would not want the electricity from this absent the carbon credits subsidy since 
it would be cheaper to get power from coal.  The Department of Water and Forestry 
(DWAF) has regulations for landfills that require the concentration of flammable gas 
                                                 
53 See: Carbon Trade Watch.  “The Sky is Not the Limit” TNI BRIEFING SERIES No 2003/1 (Amsterdam: 
Transnational Institute) 2003; Trusha Reddy “Durban’s perfume rods, plastic covers and sweet-smelling 
toxic dump” (Durban, South Africa: Centre for Civil Society Research Reports) 2005; Shankar Vedantam 
“Kyoto Credits System Aids the Rich, Some Say” The Washington Post (12 March 2005) A12 
54 Prototype Carbon Fund “Durban Gas to Electricty Project – Project Design Document” (July 2004) 
Online: Prototype Carbon Fund  
http://carbonfinance.org/pcf/Router.cfm?Page=Projects&ProjectID=3132#DocsList at 3 
55 Ibid. at 4 
56 Ibid. at 26 
 - 33 -
outside the waste disposal area not to exceed 1% by volume in air and the concentration 
of CO2 not to exceed 0.5% by volume in air.  Lindsey Strachan, head of Durban Solid 
Waste (DSW) and one of the main project proponents admits, “Even if this wasn’t a 
CDM, we’d still have to take out the gas, but not all of the gas, just what’s required by 
the regulations.”57  With the injection of carbon finance, DSW is presumably able to 
afford to capture greater portions of the gas than they would under the regulations and 
then sell it to nearby industry at a subsidized price that is competitive with coal. 
One need not look far to find reasons why opposition to this project has been so 
fierce.  For starters there is the location of the landfill sites: the La Mercy site might be 
well away from residential areas but both the Mariannhill and Bisasar Road sites are in 
residential areas.  This is less of a problem in Mariannhill as there are large buffer zones 
on all sides of the landfill.  In contrast, there are no large buffer zones at the Bisasar Road 
site where the landfill is literally within a few meters of residential houses on two sides 
and across the street from a school on a third.  Worse still, Bisasar Road is the largest 
landfill site in Africa and one of the largest in the Southern Hemisphere.  Thus the root of 
this controversial project is entirely the Bisasar Road landfill as it dwarfs the other two in 
terms of size, potential emissions reductions, and of course local opposition. 
2.1.1. A Short History of Bisasar Road 
To tell the story of Bisasar Road one must begin not with the landfill, but with the Group 
Areas Act of 1961 whereby the Apartheid government relocated the Indian population 
across Durban to the area known as Clare Estates, where Bisasar Road is situated.  As 
was typical of Apartheid, no compensation for this act was or has ever been paid and 
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many Indians were forced into greatly inferior housing settlements.  At the time of the 
resettlement there was an enormous quarry on Bisasar Road that was lined with trees and 
green space.  In 1980 when the local government was running out of landfill space, they 
converted the quarry into the Bisasar Road Dump.  The fact that this was almost an 
entirely Indian neighborhood during the time of Apartheid is not coincidental.58   
From the very beginning Bisasar was a controversial and contested.  Many of the 
Indians in Clare Estate were relatively middle class and thus had the resources to quickly 
become very organized against the dump.  The response of the City was to announce that 
the dump would close in 1987.  Seven years later they reneged on this promise, but 
assured the community that the dump would close in 1996 and then be converted into a 
recreational and sporting site.59  When 1996 came around the city began a public 
consultation process intended to get the permit to close the dump (South Africa requires 
permits not just to open a landfill site but to close it as well.)  It was at these meetings 
that local resident Sajida Khan – who lives directly across the street from the landfill, 
found out that the permit process was actually intended to extend the life of the dump 
rather than close it.  When Khan discovered this, “I just went nuts!  I wouldn’t let anyone 
else talk.  I was just so angry.”60  Khan quickly channeled her anger into an organized 
campaign.  With ten public schools within one square kilometer of the landfill, Khan 
chose to target children in her campaign and through this “the parents and other people 
would get roped in.”  Khan’s campaign tactics included placard demonstrations, 
blockades of the dump (this was the only activity little children were not involved in for 
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fear of injury), a community-wide petition with 6000 signatures, and a media blitz.  Yet 
despite Khan’s best efforts, the permit to extend the life of the dump was granted.  Worse 
still, in a wealthy white-dominated suburb to the north of Durban the Umhlanga landfill 
site was quickly closing its doors as it was ‘earmarked for up-market property 
development.’61 The rubbish from this site was rerouted to Bisasar Road. 
 
2.1.2. Health Effects of the Dump and CDM 
In addition to being the year that the Bisasar was extended and took on more rubbish 
from Umhlanga, 1996 was also the year that Sajida Khan first developed cancer.  In her 
informal surveys of the neighbourhood, Khan claims that seven out of ten residents in the 
area of Clare Estates closest to the landfill have reported at least one person in their 
household developing cancer.  Among these victims is Khan’s own nephew who died of 
leukemia.  For Khan and other residents in Clare Estates there is only one place to lay the 
finger for their poor health: the dump.  Prior to the 1990s there were very few 
government regulations on waste management and thus Bisasar was able to have a 
medical waste incinerator on its site and accept other forms of hazardous waste.62  Even 
when stricter regulations were put in place and the landfill ceased incinerating hazardous 
waste, Khan still cites unsubstantiated studies where the limits of waste emissions 
considered potentially hazardous were exceeded in hydrogen chloride by 50%, cadmium 
by 200%, and lead by more than 1000%. Limits for suspended particulate matter were 
also exceeded.63   
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It is not surprising that Sajida Khan’s assessment of the health impacts of Bisasar 
Road would be disputed by officials at Durban Solid Waste.  According to Lindsay 
Strachan, “We’ve brought in experts to assess the health risks.  Their main concern was 
formaldehyde, but the health experts couldn’t discern if it was burning from Kennedy 
Road or if it was landfill.”64  Strachan believes that any health threats in the area would 
indeed come from the informal housing community on Kennedy Road who regularly 
burn wood and other materials for heating and cooking as they do not have electricity.  
As to Khan’s survey of ten households in Clare Estates with high rates of cancer, 
Strachan questions her methodology and research qualifications thus concluding that her 
research is “absolutely codswallop!”65  Furthermore, Strachan points out that there is a 
one in four cancer incidence rate in Durban and therefore “how do we know [these 
people’s cancer] is from the dump?  With those odds, it could be from anything?”66 
Whether cancer rates can be attributed to the landfill or not, a growing concern in 
Clare Estates is that the CDM project will create more air pollution and potentially 
adverse health effects rather than alleviate them.  Khan calculates that each year, the 
methane electricity generators will pump out 95 tons of nitrogen oxides, 319 tons of 
carbon monoxide, 323 tons of hydro-carbons and 43 256 tons of carbon dioxide. Nitrogen 
oxides are a respiratory irritant and exacerbated asthma, carbon monoxide reduces the 
oxygen-carrying capacity of the blood, and carcinogens such as benzene and butadiene 
could be found in hydrocarbons.67 These figures should not be interpreted literally 
however as the scientific validity of Khan’s own calculations has not been confirmed. 
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2.1.3. The Issue of Closure 
Though the Clare Estate community remains concerned over potential health impacts 
from the CDM project, their main point of contention with this project is the widely held 
perception that it will further prolong the life of the landfill site.  Lindsay Strachan 
adamantly rejects this perception and argues that the landfill gas must be captured either 
way so it doesn’t matter if the landfill is still accepting waste or not.  In addition, 
Strachan is just as insistent that “the dump is closing…the city is saying we’ll close it.”68  
The way the city is going about this is through the creation of a waste transfer station 
near the south end of the landfill so that when the site closes waste can be transferred to a 
new landfill further away.  According to Strachan, the environmental impact assessment 
for the transfer station is costing the city about R1 million, which could then be expanded 
to include closure for the landfill, “The transfer station is the start of the closure 
process.”69  Ironically, Strachan blames the resident’s opposition to the transfer station – 
which they see as just further development and pollution in their neighbourhood – as an 
impediment to closure, “If you walk into a room and you’re just heckled, you can’t talk to 
people.  So the dump continues.”70  At the end of the day, Strachan wants to sympathize 
with the local residents and claims to be much more concerned about the viability of the 
CDM project than the continued operations of Bisasar Road.  He states, “I haven’t 
received a closure demand in 2 years; they’re now driving the anti-CDM train; they 
should keep driving the site closure train and make it quite clear that if you close the 
landfill we want this gas project as long as the landfill is closed.”71 
                                                 
68 Strachan, supra note 57 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
 - 38 -
There is substantial evidence to contradict Strachan’s view that the CDM and 
continued operation of the landfill are not related.  For example, in the 2004 project 
design document that Strachan helped to prepare the baseline methodology for this 
project states: 
All three landfills have remaining capacity and, with the exception of La Mercy, 
can continue to operate throughout the crediting period. Considering the high 
costs of developing new landfill sites, it is not reasonable to expect that the 
municipality would close these landfills before they are full, nor are there any 
plans for the construction of replacement sites.72 
 
The crediting period referred to in the PDD was seven years with two optional renewals 
of the same amount.  When Strachan claims “the dump is closing” he fails to mention 
that this would be in twenty-one years.  In addition, a senior engineer at DSW who has 
worked at the landfill for four years, admitted he did not know anything about an 
impending closure while giving a tour of the landfill: “What closure?  There’s room here 
for at least another decade of landfill.”73  
 While there is still no irrefutable evidence that CDM project is what is keeping 
the Bisasar Road Landfill open, there does appear to be a casual link between the two.  
This link is carbon credits, or to be more precise, an estimated $20,000 Rand per day of 
potential carbon finance that could be coming into Durban, according to Strachan’s 
calculations.  Yet when he was asked whether these calculations involve the landfill site 
being open or closed, Strachan told a local newspaper reporter, “The site has the potential 
to produce 8000 cubic metres of methane an hour and closure would bring that down to 
7000 cubic metres, so the difference is somewhat negligible.”74  Whether a difference of 
12.5% of production is “negligible” in a US$15 million deal with the World Bank’s PCF 
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should be treated as more than a rhetorical question.  When asked, Strachan refused to 
indicate whether he used the higher or lower number in his discussions with them and in 
the PDD.   
One final issue to mention around closure, though it often gets glossed over in any 
representation of the Bisasar Road landfill controversy, is the informal housing settlement 
on Kennedy Road, directly adjacent to the landfill.  As some of the Apartheid laws began 
to relax in the late 1980s, in particular the Group Areas Act, a sizable group of Zulus 
moved into the area around Kennedy Road that runs along the western border of the 
Bisasar Road landfill.  This settlement also illustrates the unique tendency for groups of 
people to gravitate towards waste management facilities where “waste picking” and other 
scavenging offer an alternative means of survival when government resources are limited 
and unemployment rates are astronomical.75 This intentional settlement of now nearly 
1000 people next to the landfill creates obvious conflicts with the rest of Clare Estates 
who had the landfill involuntarily imposed on them.  An employee of DSW describes the 
divergence between Clare Estate and Kennedy Road as “one community built up because 
of the landfill, while the other wants the landfill closed.”76   
In the struggle around landfill closure and the CDM, the strategic support of the 
Kennedy Road community by DSW is considered a very high priority.  To this end, the 
World Bank commissioned a formal recognition of the Kennedy Road community, which 
local activist and scholar Raj Patel observes, “seems central to the community’s support 
of the project…in contrast with richer activists [who ignore Kennedy Road.]”77 
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Moreover, in eliciting the support of the community for the CDM project, Lindsay 
Strachan offered forty-five jobs and three bursaries to children from “affected 
communities to study engineering, possibly in Uganda,” though it should be noted that 
within the Kennedy Road settlement, this figured is believed to be fifty scholarships.78  
Whatever the figure, community leaders in Kennedy Road are convinced that the 
continued operation of the landfill offers them the best opportunities for economic 
advancement while remaining in relative proximity to the city centre.  This results in 
active opposition of the campaigns of Sajida Khan and others in the Clare Estate to close 
the dump and a general breakdown of community relations.  For her part, Sajida Khan 
points the finger at Lindsay Strachan for using this divide and conquer strategy and 
claims “I have nothing against these people…I am fighting for all of us, no one wants to 
live next to a smelly dump.”79 
2.1.4. The Present Status of the Project 
In June 2002, just after the PCF signed an Emissions Reductions Purchase Agreement 
with DSW for the CDM project, Sajida Khan filed a lawsuit against the Ethekwini 
municipality and the federal Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism for 
negligence in permitting the continued operation of the Bisasar Road Landfill.  After 
three years of delays, the case was due to be heard in Fall of 2005 but Khan’s cancer had 
rapidly deteriorated and the case will remain in the docket until she is declared fit enough 
to participate in the legal action.  In addition to the legal action, an appeal to the Minister 
of the Department of Water and Forestry at the provincial level has been delaying the 
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project approval.  Strachan estimates the cost of these delays for the municipality will be 
upwards of R 40,000.80 
 In light of these delays at Bisasar there was an unsubstantiated rumour circulating 
around Durban in the spring of 2005 that the World Bank had told DSW that it had until 
October to sort out the “outstanding issues” relating to Bisasar Road or it would pull out 
of the project.81  Though Lindsey Strachan flatly denied this, it may not be coincidental 
that in late August 2005, DSW submitted a PDD to the CDM Executive Board for the 
two projects at La Mercy and Mariannhill but did not mention anything about Bisasar 
Road.  This is a significant admission as these two smaller project total a mere 3 MW of 
power between them and only 50,000 tonnes of CO2e emissions reductions, compared to 
10 MW at Bisasar Road and 3.1 million tones of CO2e.  Thus it appears for at least the 
time being that Sajida Khan’s many years of tireless campaigning have won her a 
temporary victory in delaying this CDM project. There have been no recent decisions or 
announcements relating to the eventual closure of the Bisasar Road Landfill site.   
2.2. Sasol’s Pipeline 
As one of South Africa’s largest companies – nearly US $12 billion in assets in 2004 and 
a total profit of US$1.4bn – Sasol describes its business interests as “Chemicals, mining, 
and synthetic liquid fuel synthesis.”82 Sasol had its headquarters and a large production 
facility in Sasolburg (the city is named after the company, not vice verse) and another 
plant in Secunda, which has the dubious distinction of being the largest point source 
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emitter of carbon dioxide on the African continent.83 Sasol’s entry into the carbon market 
was initiated following its decision to build a 865 kilometre pipeline to carry natural gas 
from the Temane and Pande fields in Mozambique to its facilities in Sasolburg and 
Secunda.  The pipeline is being used to supplement coal as the feedstock in Sasol’s liquid 
fuel synthesis processes at the Secunda plant and replace it entirely in Sasolburg.   
This particular CDM project is unique for a number of reasons.  For starters, with 
an estimated annual reduction of 6.5 million tonnes of CO2e, it represents one of the 
largest CDM projects in Africa to date (by comparison Bisasar Road is about half this 
size and that is with a gas eleven times more potent than CO2, here we just have CO2.)  
Secondly, this is the only project this author is aware of that was developed entirely 
without any input from foreign or domestic CDM consultants.  Sasol appears to be doing 
this all by itself, which is quite rare considering the level of expertise required to navigate 
the complex processes and nomenclature of the CDM.  Third, and perhaps most 
importantly, this project highlights some of the most critical questions about the 
additionality requirement. 
The root of Sasol’s additionality issue is their upfront admission in their Project 
Identification Note that their coal mine in Sasolburg “reached the end of its economic life 
in 2001.”84  This was a well-known fact at the time, since the drop of production at the 
mine from 70 million tones/year to 2 million had forced enormous layoffs and attracted 
media attention.  Following this, Sasol began trucking ~12,500 tonnes of coal per day 
into Sasolburg from Secunda, a procedure they admitted “was not an economically 
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sustainable mode of operation.”85  Therefore, the company devised two potential options 
forward; build a new mine further outside Sasolburg or build a natural gas pipeline to 
Mozambique. 
In their PIN, Sasol argues that their baseline scenario would indeed be to build the 
coalmine, despite “public concern over the strip mine proposed by Sasol…which would 
have been situated on the banks of the Vaal river.”86  Even though there was “a desire 
from Sasol and the South African government to reduce local air pollution…there was no 
incentive or legal obligation to do so at the time” and thus continued coal emissions were 
a suitable baseline scenario.87  This was contrasted by the “numerous and difficult to 
manage barriers” of building the pipeline including capital costs, political instability, and 
fluctuating natural gas prices.  Taking these barriers into consideration, Sasol’s most 
likely baseline scenario was to build another mine, and thus absent carbon finance they 
would not have built the pipeline. 
If one were only to read Sasol’s PIN it would be difficult to offer sufficient 
evidence to properly counter their baseline scenario.  But I was able to able to find out the 
real story about Sasol when I attended a meeting of the South African National Energy 
Association at the Siemens Headquarters in Sandton, outside of Johannesburg.  At this 
meeting of energy representatives and lobbyist, Sasol’s Natural Gas Supply Manager, 
Peter Geef, gave a very informative PowerPoint presentation on the pipeline and the 
reasons that Sasol built it.  While Mr. Geef went through his presentation including slides 
such as “What was this project about?” and “What made the project possible?” any 
mention of carbon finance was curiously absent.  Even when discussing specifics of 
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project finance, there was no mention of CERs, just that the project’s US$1.2 billion 
sticker price has been “completely paid for.”88  Finally when it was time for questions, 
Mr. Geef was directly asked whether there were any outstanding financial inputs for this 
project, to which he responded in the negative.  At this point I asked him if Sasol was 
indeed pursuing carbon credits for their pipeline, whereupon he admitted:  
Yes we are indeed trying to get some carbon finance for this pipeline…(But) we 
have this problem of additionality; we think there’s a case to be made for that, 
we’re in discussion with the South African government now and we’re trying to 
make the case for it…The Biggest issue is additionality; we would have done this 
project anyway. (Emphasis added.)89 
 
Having publicly admitted that their project does not meet the additionality requirement of 
the CDM, the question then became why they are pursuing carbon finance.  To this, Mr. 
Geef answered, “mainly financial reasons; you get a lot of pay-back in terms of dollars 
per tonne.”90  
Not wanting to entirely trust the unassuming musings of a mid-level manager, I 
contacted Sasol’s “Greenhouse Gas Abatement Officer” Gerrit Kornelius.  Though 
Kornelius never admitted the project wasn’t additional, his defense of the project was not 
particularly convincing.  In response to questions about finance, Mr. Kornelius forwarded 
an article from the June 2004 edition of Global Energy Review on the project.  Though 
this article goes into great detail about the project’s “financing strategy” and includes a 
“summary of financing package,” it never once mentions anything to do with carbon 
finance.91  Following up on this point, Kornelius justified Sasol’s pursuit of carbon 
finance on the basis that “a recent review has indicated that the IRR (internal rate of 
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return) is [at this stage] somewhat lower than envisaged in the original board submission 
for project approval, and that did not meet the normal hurdle rates for projects - this is 
one of the arguments for the additionality claim.”92  Thus Sasol’s apparent interpretation 
of additionality is not in comparison with what you would have done anyway, but rather 
an additional bonus for something you already did yet wished were more profitable.  For 
Richard Worthington of the South African Climate Action Network, an organization not 
known to be hostile to the CDM, “We will consistently criticize Sasol for this; the local 
coal mine is tapping out, you’re a (very) rich company, and this pipeline entrenches their 
monopoly.  To look for CER capital is just baseless greed.”93  On the face of it, it is very 
hard to disagree with this interpretation. 
 
2.3. Landfill Gas Capture in Bellville 
It was the original intention of this research project to give a broader overview of the 
South African carbon market, in particular, to provide a better context to the 
disproportionate attention that the Bisasar Road landfill has received in academic and 
mainstream media.  Therefore, although reviewing a second landfill gas (LFG) capture 
project might not serve the purpose of providing the widest possible representation of the 
South African carbon market, it does greatly assist in the objective of providing much 
better context to what is happening in Durban. 
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2.3.1. Project Background and Durban Comparisons 
South Africa’s second LFG CDM is located at the Bellville South Waste Disposal 
(BSWD), which used to be in the city of Bellville – north of Cape Town – until it became 
incorporated into the larger Cape Town municipality in 1997.  The LFG project itself is 
quite similar to Durban; drilling wells to capture LFG through active extraction, aimed at 
optimising gas production that would result in a “conservative” 70% of the gas being 
captured and utilised instead of the 30% which is presently just flared.94  Since BSWD is 
smaller than Bisasar Road, the expected annual emissions reductions from the LFG 
capture and offset coal emissions are one third of Durban’s with 1.2 million tonnes CO2e.  
This figure is somewhat controversial, at least to Lindsay Strachen, who believes “they’re 
over-estimating their LFG potential.”95 
 In terms of the present status of this project, the baseline methodology, initial 
technical and financial feasibility studies have been completed.  A PDD has also been 
prepared, though it hasn’t been submitted to the DNA.  Outstanding milestones include a 
conclusive technical and financial feasibility study, the establishment of a management 
structure, ability to deal with the extraction and sale of the gas, as well as undertaking the 
required EIA and public participation processes.96 
 Taking a step back and comparing the two LFG projects, there are some notable 
similarities and differences between them.  It has already been mentioned that BSWD is 
smaller and at an earlier stage of development.  The Bellville project is also being 
developed under the close supervision of SSN, a non-profit consultancy that has a much 
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more legitimate claim to be concerned about developing sustainable projects than other 
consultancies like Ecosecurities, or in the case of Durban, the PCF.97  Finally, there are 
some notable differences in terms of the host municipality.  In Durban, the environmental 
planning department is eleven people and CDM projects are almost entirely handled by 
Deborah Roberts, who admits “climate change is something we get to between half past 
two in the morning and three.”98  In Cape Town, 106 people work in environmental 
planning, and climate change gets its own office, headed by the very capable Craig 
Haskins.  Cape Town is also very active in the Cities for Climate Protection program and 
boasts an unparalleled expertise of the issue compared with almost any other level of 
government in the country.  It is perhaps the more progressive nature of the municipality 
and non-profit consultancy that led to BSDW being on track to be a “Gold Standard” 
CDM project.  The legitimacy of the Gold Standard in relation to this particular project is 
an issue we shall return to shortly. 
 Yet in light of these contextual differences, there are some very key similarities 
between the two landfills, mainly their location in urban areas and the ongoing struggles 
over closure.  Though these two issues should be recognized as co-related, they will be 
dealt with separately for the purposes of this analysis.  
The BSWD site was used in the early 1930’s for sewage disposal and has been in 
operation as a waste disposal site since the 1960’s.  This landfill site was initially built 
remote from any human settlements but is now surrounded by the Belhar community as 
close as just 10 metres from the western boundary due to rapid urban development 
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dramatic urban sprawl that has taken place over the past two decades.99  As is typical of 
South Africa, the Belhar community is composed largely of coloured and Indian 
inhabitants as white people rarely live within any close propinquity to landfill sites.  The 
site was closed prematurely for a period of time due to the “close proximity to residential 
areas and the risk of contamination to the underlying Cape Flats aquifer.”100 Following 
reconstruction of local government in 1997, the Cape Town Municipal Corporation took 
over the responsibility for operating the site from the former Bellville Municipality and 
extended the catchment area to try to protect the aquifer.  The decision to re-open the 
landfill enraged local residents, who formed two separate organizations; the poorer and 
blacker Landfill Monitoring Group, and the richer and more Indian-based Belhar 
Development Forum to fight the landfill.  The residents from both groups were somewhat 
placated by the city’s pledge to close the site in 2006.  However, the city is presently 
trying to extend the dump until 2009.  With this process taking place at the same time as 
discussions around the CDM project, many residents are beginning to connect the two. 
As was the case in Durban, the project developer, Walter Loots, head of Cape 
Town Solid Waste, adamantly denies even the slightest causal connection between 
keeping the dump open and the CDM project.  For Loots, the simple fact of the matter is 
that Cape Town “is running out of landfill space…the only alternative is a regional 
landfill 60 kilometers out of town.  This will have significant costs attached to it.”101  
Moreover, the project developers at South South North believe, “For CDM project to 
happen, landfill has to be capped.  Even with an extension to 2009, the portion that stays 
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open will be capped soon and the portion for 2006 will be capped now.”102  How it can be 
that the landfill must be capped for Cape Town to extract the gas, yet Durban can keep a 
dump open for twenty-one years and get 3 millions tonnes of CO2e per year remains a 
mystery.  It was also never revealed whether there is a difference in available gas to be 
captured if the landfill stays open or not and whether this was included in the PDD’s 
calculations, as was so clearly the case in Durban.  Therefore, it is difficult to conclude 
with any degree of certainty the role the CDM project may play in the continued 
operations of the Bellville South facility.  What is known though is that local residents 
oppose this continued operation, and the CDM’s even proximate association to that raises 
some questions about how much LFG capture projects contribute to the well-being of the 
local communities in Cape Town, Durban, or anywhere else.  The fact that this particular 
project appears to be certified as a “Gold Standard” for the highest level of environmental 
and social sustainability makes these questions all the more pressing. 
2.3.2. The Gold Standard 
As has previously been mentioned, the ability for host countries to set their own 
sustainable development criteria has been condemned by social actors as impeding the 
accountability of the DNA and the development of quality projects.  In trying to prevent 
this situation, SSN with the support of the Climate Action Network established a set of 
universal sustainable development benchmarks in 1999.  These efforts culminated in the 
“SSN Matrix” yet were to be ignored during the following Marrakech negotiations that 
set the rules for the CDM, where each country was allowed to judge projects by their own 
criterion.  As the market began to develop in ways that these ENGOs feared it would; 
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including widespread “failure to demonstrate ‘additionality’ and deliver added 
environmental and social benefits,”103 the World Wildlife Fund once again undertook 
efforts to establish universal benchmarks.  In May 2003 the WWF released the ‘Gold 
Standard’: a code of best practices and criteria “necessary to deliver real contributions to 
sustainable development in host countries plus long term benefits to the climate.”104   
The Gold Standard, which admittedly shares strong similarities with SSN Matrix, 
differs from the regular benchmarks of a CDM project in three important ways.  First, 
there are fewer methodologies that qualify for a Gold Standard rating as compared to a 
normal CDM, and they must fall into the two broad categories of renewable energy and 
energy efficiency.  Second, the additionality requirements are claimed to be stricter than 
the CDM since project developers must show that carbon credits enable the project 
activity to overcome at least one barrier from a list of five categories: financial, political, 
institutional, technological and economic.  Most importantly, the Gold Standard seeks to 
ensure that the sustainable development aspects of CDM project activities are 
“maximized” through the obligatory use of “sustainability matrix Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) procedures.”  These enhanced EIA procedures stress public 
consultation and evidence that the project contributes to sustainability in three main 
areas: a) local/regional/global environment: impacts on air/water/soil quality and 
biodiversity; b) social sustainability: impacts on poverty alleviation, access to energy 
services, and human capacity (i.e. empowerment, education, gender); and c) economic 
development: employment, balance of payments, technological self-reliance.105 
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The Gold Standard is currently being overseen by BASE in Switzerland.  They 
have already certified the Bellville South project to be “in compliance to the Gold 
Standard Label.”  More specifically BSWD was seen to have “a positive scoring for all 
the pillars, with significant contribution in term of the local, regional and global 
environment and has scored lesser, but by no means insignificant contribution toward 
social sustainability and economic and technological development.”106  The certification 
of this CDM project to be in compliance with the Gold Standard raises a number of 
critical questions about the validity of this measure and the CDM market in general. 
To begin with the issue of economic development, SSN, the project developer, 
admits that the economic development impacts of this project “would be less significant, 
this is however counter balanced by the cost effectiveness of the project due to the 
potential income from carbon finance and the sale of gas.”107 Thus the impression is that 
as long as the project is capable of making a lot of money, it can in theory contribute to 
economic development depending on how that money is spent.  Yet within the city of 
Cape Town there is no consensus for how carbon finance from BSDW would be used.  
The people at SSN hope to apply the carbon profits from Bellville to other CDM projects 
in the area that are much less economically viable, such as the Kuyasa energy upgrade 
(discussed in the next section.)  Craig Haskins at the City of Cape Town confirmed that 
discussion on how the revenue will be spent have taken place, but no decision was made 
in his department as they did not have the institutional mandate to do so.  Should SSN’s 
proposal be adopted by the City council, it is still unclear how taking carbon finance out 
of the local community in Bellville would further economic development there.   
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As to social indicators it seems ironic that a project that is widely opposed by the 
local community could register a “by no means insignificant contribution towards local 
sustainability.”  Does this imply that persons living in the vicinity of the Bellville South 
landfill do not understand the meaning of sustainability and know what is good for them?  
Or rather does it reflect the supposed confusion between the continued operations of the 
landfill and the CDM project, as is the case in Durban?  Taking this as the case, it is still 
curious how a CDM project that operates on a landfill site that has remained open far 
beyond the desires of local residents can somehow lead to improved livelihoods among 
local residents.  This might be possible if the electricity generated from the project was to 
be distributed freely to the surrounding community, yet such a proposal that has not been 
given any consideration in Bellville nor Durban. 
Finally turning to environmental sustainability it seems to be commonsense that a 
project that reduces harmful GHG emissions would by its very nature deserve recognition 
as furthering local and global sustainability.  The only way this may not be the case is if 
the project were to result in such damage to either the air, water, or soil in the 
surrounding area to cause a net negative impact on the environment.  Although there are 
some questions about the impact of the landfill on the local aquifer and the releases of 
particulate matter from the methane generators, these do not appear to subsume the 
ecological benefits of preventing methane release.  Yet one can still make a very strong 
case that this project should not be considered sustainable by any definition of the word. 
According to the Gold Standard, Bellville South is a “renewable energy” project 
under the category of “ecologically sound biogas.”108  Yet for this to really be considered 
“ecologically sound” a number of important questions about waste management deserve 
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to be answered.  In December 2000, the City of Cape Town released an “Integrated 
Waste Management Plan” (IWMP) that recognized the need to find alternatives to the 
present status quo around waste management in the city.  In particular, the IWMP 
focused on the need to develop strategies for waste reduction as a top sustainable 
development priority, a discussion completely absent in this CDM project.109 
In addition, Walter Loots, head of Solid Waste for municipality and the lead 
author of the IWMP, admits that the present landfill practices are not sustainable, 
especially in light of lack of available space for landfills: “land is at an absolute 
premium.”110  For Loots, the “real solution to the problem is in sorting and treating 
waste.”111 According to the IWMP, approximately 50% of the waste in Cape Town 
landfills comprises of biodegradable organic material.  If this was separated out from the 
non-organic material, the City of Cape Town would be able to vastly decrease its need for 
landfill space as well as capture a much higher amount of methane.  Methane is generated 
from rotting organic material, yet when this is mixed in with non-organic material as is 
typical practice in landfills, the amount that can be captured is reduced.  For example, the 
best capture rate proposed in the Bellville project is still only 70% (it’s 83% in Durban) 
but with separated organic material this amount gets much closer to 100%.  Thus to try to 
capture methane from a regular landfill, as is the aim of this CDM project, is “an 
inefficient solution to an avoidable problem,” according to Loots.112   
It is curious that a project deemed an “inefficient solution to an avoidable 
problem” by the very expert in waste management who designed the project should also 
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be considered to make a “significant contribution in term of the local, regional and global 
environment,” by the Gold Standard.  The reason for this apparent contradiction is two-
fold.  First, as Loots is only too ready to admit, the City of Cape Town simply does not 
have the resources to institute a large-scale recycling and waste separation scheme.  For 
Loots, “our first priority is equitable service delivery.  We are getting lots of pressure to 
have a better recycling program and I would love to have a wet/dry program.  But it is 
simply politically unacceptable for recycling to happen in richer neighbourhoods while 
there is still no roadside collection of waste in poorer ones.”113  To support this position, 
Loots cites the 155,000 families in informal settlements across the municipality, 
especially the township of Khayelitsha, who lack access to basic services including waste 
pickup.  Deborah Roberts, the director of environmental management at eThekwini, 
echoes her Cape Town colleague’s sentiment:  
We are a couple of decades away from that ideal in terms of solid waste 
management.  South African society simply isn’t ready for that type of policy.  We 
consider it bloody marvellous that we can even get waste into the landfill. People 
here believe that if you throw something down the street it creates jobs.114  
 
Thus the argument for the CDM in South African landfills even as a Gold Standard is not 
that it is the most sustainable solution but rather that it is the only one they can afford in 
light of present political considerations. 
 Yet this conclusion only reinforces the failure of imagination in the carbon market 
to produce forward-thinking projects that have long-lasting social and environmental 
benefits for the community.  A CDM project that provided the capital for a municipality 
to put in a widespread recycling and waste separation system would have undeniable 
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environmental and social benefits.  The space required for landfills would be vastly 
reduced and without the organic material rotting they would cause much less nuisance to 
surrounding areas.  In addition to improving productive methane capture from the sorted 
organic material, the better solution for avoiding climate change, the very act of sorting 
this would create thousands of employment opportunities, the importance of which 
cannot be denied in a country like South Africa with an estimated unemployment rate of 
44%.  Surely this is the type of project that a “Gold Standard” for the CDM should be 
certifying.  Instead they have chosen to certify a project that provides no employment 
gains or other social benefits and only further entrenches an unsustainable form of waste 
management.  As such, the Gold Standard seems to have become the victim of the very 
scourge it was set up to avoid: the propensity of Northern governments to only invest in 
projects that offer maximum return on investment with little added environmental and 
social benefits.  Worse, it has now given these projects greater legitimacy and demand. 
 Yet as we shall now see, even if this Gold Standard project was able to provide all 
of the social and environmental benefits as listed above, the global carbon market has 
developed in such a perverse way that it would be unable to make it financially viable. 
2.4. The Kuyasa Low-cost Housing Energy Upgrade Project 
On 27 August 2005, the CDM Executive Board officially certified the Kuyasa low-cost 
housing energy upgrade project as both the first African project and the first Gold 
Standard project to receive certified emissions reductions credits.  It was a great day for 
the project developers; the City of Cape Town and SSN, as well as the ten beneficiaries 
of the project living in Kuyasa, a neighbourhood in the township of Khayelitsha outside 
of Cape Town.  In addition to being a groundbreaking CDM project for Africa and the 
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Gold Standard, the Kuyasa CDM is the only African project this author is aware of where 
the local residents actively supported the project, rather than opposed it (as is the case 
with the LFG capture) or at best were indifferent.  As such, Kuyasa has been held up as 
an example of the enormous potential of carbon trading to both fight climate change and 
improve living conditions in local communities.  Unfortunately the reality of the situation 
is just the opposite; rather than being an example of what the CDM can deliver, Kuyasa is 
a testament to what it cannot. 
2.4.1. Project Background  
 
On the face if it, there is very little not to like about the Kuyasa CDM project.  The first 
phase of the project got underway in July 2002.  It involves retrofitting ten RDP 
(Reconstruction and Development Programme) homes with insulated ceilings (where 
there would normally just be a corrugated steel roof), replacing regular lighting with low-
watt compact florescent bulbs, and installing solar water heaters on the roofs.  In the 
absence of the water heaters, residents would use electric geysers to heat their water and 
thus the project creates a hypothetical suppressed demand for coal-fired electricity.  In 
total, 2.85 tonnes of CO2 per household per year would be avoided as a result of the 
project.115  Ensuring the accuracy of this figure was one of the aims of the first phase of 
the project where much emphasis is on monitoring the ‘baseline methodologies.’  The 
second phase of the project hopes to replicate the baseline study on 2299 RDP homes 
throughout Kuyasa.  
One of the most likable aspects of this project is that from the very beginning 
there have been extensive consultations with the community.  The City of Cape Town 
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and SSN have worked closely with the ward development forum (WDF) in Kuyasa, who 
put together a broad-based steering committee of community members who were able to 
take ownership of the project through key decisions.  These decisions included assisting 
the design of the project, deciding which ten households would participate, and how to 
move forward into phase two of the project.  The steering committee also played an 
active facilitation role between the project developers and broader community so there 
were ongoing opportunities for public input over the project.   
In terms of the Gold Standard, this project “attains positive scores in all of the 
pillars. It has a particularly high rating in terms of social sustainability and local 
development and has a minimal impact, apart from the reduction of GHG on the natural 
environment.”116 As to the social/economic development, the project creates employment 
opportunities through the instillation and maintenance of the solar water heaters, which 
are locally manufactured.  Furthermore, the R625 average annual savings on electricity 
bills can go back into the local economy and create further economic spin-offs.117   
During a site visit in Kuyasa, I had the opportunity to interview one of the project 
participants named Muzelli, an unemployed man in his thirties confined to a wheelchair.  
Through a translator (Muzelli only speaks Xhosa, as is common in Khayelitsha) Muzelli 
told of how he now saves over 600 Rand per year on his electricity bills, which he is able 
to send back home to support his children still living in the Eastern Cape.  When the 
weather gets cold at night (it can get below ten degrees Celsius during winter evenings) 
all of Muzelli’s neighbours come over to visit as his ceiling keeps the house much 
warmer than anywhere else in the neighbourhood.  Though he admitted that he did not 
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know much about climate change, Muzelli made it clear that people support the project 
for many other reasons, namely the money they save and having warmer houses.  As he 
stated, “this is a good project.  People are very impatient to get their homes upgraded, 
they really want this project.”118  During our interview word got around the 
neighbourhood of my arrival and by the time I went to leave a small crowd had gather 
outside of the house eager to shake my hand and ask when their water heaters would 
arrive.  One need not require much more evidence than that to support a project like this. 
2.4.2. The Financial Imperative 
As wonderful as this project appears to be, when one begins to look into the financial 
aspects of it, the unfortunate reality of the carbon market is revealed.  Of the total budget 
for the first phase of this project, carbon finance will cover around 15% of the upfront 
costs assuming current carbon prices.  To quote Lester Malengis from SSN who has 
worked on this project for the past two years, “this is first a project that uplifts Kuyasa, 
not a carbon project…that funding is not sustainable.”119  With carbon credits making up 
only a fraction of the budget, this project has been able to go ahead due to the generous 
funding it has received from other sources: R12.4 million from the Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism in Pretoria, another R4 million from the province of 
the Western Cape, and R450,000 from Electricity de France as part of their Corporate 
Social Responsibility campaign.120 In addition to this funding, SSN and CCT also 
donated hundreds of hours of labour not compensated through project finance.  For 
Richard Worthington of SACAN, though Kuyasa seems to be an example of the project 
                                                 
118 Muzelli (Kuyasa project beneficiary) personal interview 6 July 2005 
119 Malgas, supra note 97 
120 Rosenberg, supra note 102 
 - 59 -
people had in mind when the CDM was conceived, “its clearly got to where it got to 
because it’s been treated as a charity case. It’s been damn expensive and not at all an 
example of how to put a project together.”121 
 In the early Autumn of 2005, South South North secured additional funding of 
approximately R 25 million from the Provincial Administration of the Western Cape and 
the national Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism. It is anticipated that this 
funding will be sufficient to retrofit all 2299 remaining houses within the project 
boundary.  Much like the first phase, the carbon revenue stream comprises around 15% of 
the upfront costs of the project at current carbon prices.122  To this end, the first 10,000 
CERs from this project have been sold at a price of €15 to the UK government to offset 
the G8 summit at Gleneagles.123 While one need not question the UK government’s 
motives, it is worth noting that using the offset market for this deal is somewhat 
problematic.  The offset market is entirely voluntary-initiatives and lacks any of the 
regulatory oversights of the CDM market.  The possibilities for fraud in this market are 
thus enormous, though the Kuyasa project’s reductions appear to be quite legitimate. 
 With the vast majority of funding for this project now secured through the 
government, SSN is now officially referring to the project as “a public sector project, 
relying on government grant funding for its implementation.”124 Though the 
government’s support of the Kuyasa project is not doubt laudable, it is still susceptible to 
criticism based on other pressing priorities.  To give one example of another priority, 
housing activist Peter van Hausen notes that there is currently a backlog of 260,000 
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houses that need to be built in the City of Cape Town, which is growing at a rate of 
20,000 per year; 9,000 from old/derelict homes, 11,000 from new arrivals.125 This 
backlog has almost doubled since 1994, which is due in part to the influx of people into 
the area post-Apartheid, but mainly state’s unwilling/inability to tackle the problem.  For 
example, the City of Cape Town under-spent its housing budget in 2004, where only 
4000 new housing opportunities were developed.  In 2005 their aim is 8000, though this 
will not even cover the new demand for homes, let alone address the backlog.  In light of 
this dire situation it is difficult to justify public expenditures on energy upgrades for 
people who already own their homes when millions of people don’t. 
 
2.5. Conclusion 
Looking back on the various projects in South Africa, the contradictions embedded in the 
carbon market become quickly apparent.  The best project in the country is the least 
profitable from a carbon finance perspective, due in no small part to the types of projects 
found elsewhere in the country.  Durban and South Bellville are still very profitable at a 
lower carbon price because the potency of methane still means they get twenty-one times 
more carbon credits than a project like Kuyasa that only involves CO2 reduction.  Sasol’s 
project has already been entirely paid for so anything they receive in terms of carbon 
finance will be pure profit.  Kuyasa doesn’t have either of these luxuries, which helps 
explain why renewable energy projects are only 5% of the global carbon market.  When 
you are not low-hanging fruit, you’re simply not that appetizing to carbon capital. 
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3. Chapter Three: Institutional Oversight  
As we have just seen, there are some major flaws in the South African carbon market that 
translate into questionable projects being developed and potentially verified, while better 
projects are unable to find sufficient carbon finance.  The question now becomes what 
capacity exists to oversee this market and filter out the dubious projects so they cannot 
impede some of the more progressive projects.  To answer this question, this chapter will 
consider institutional capacity at all levels of government within South Africa as well as 
the international governance structures. 
3.1. The Designated National Authority 
As was mentioned in Chapter One, it is the role of the DNA to set up sustainable 
development criteria for the host country and then judge projects on this basis.  The DNA 
can also comment on methodologies and baseline scenarios, but that responsibility is 
largely left to the Designated Operation Entity (see section 3.2 below for that discussion.)  
In South Africa there appears to be three main challenges to the DNA’s ability to play its 
oversight role as laid out in the Marrakech Accord.  These include its compromised 
placement within the Department of Minerals and Energy, its limited resources, and its 
broadly defined sustainable development characteristics. 
 One of the first real struggles around the CDM in South Africa was over the 
decision about which department the DNA should be located in.  Environmental groups, 
led by the SACAN, wanted the DNA either in the Department of Environmental Affairs 
and Tourism (DEAT) or the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI).  Yet it was the 
Department of Minerals and Energy (DME) who were able to convince cabinet that since 
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most CDM projects are energy related they should be in the place where there is the most 
energy expertise.  As to the alternatives, the DNA claims that DEAT didn’t want them in 
their department; “they were scared of this; they said ‘it’s going to be huge.’”126  
Nonetheless many activists, such as Richard Worthington of SACAN, continue to believe 
that the DME’s role of promoting CDM projects has left the DNA in an ultimately 
compromised position in its attempts to vigorously adjudicate the same projects.127 
 One unfortunate consequences of the controversy over where to house the DNA 
was that it was not until December 2004 that the office eventually got up and running.  
Even when it did, the DNA was solely one person: Luwazikazi Tyani.  When 
interviewed, Ms. Tyani admitted to being a bit overwhelmed during the first six months 
on the job as it was very difficult to maintain the strict turn-around times (usually thirty 
days) expected of validators in the CDM project cycle.  Though this human capacity 
problem seems to be getting addressed by the recent arrival of some admin staff to the 
DNA, they still lack the resources to really engage the public on potential projects.  The 
only mechanism the DNA has for this task is their website where citizens can post 
comments on projects within a thirty day time period.  For the millions of South Africans 
without internet access there is no alternative for them to participate in the “public” 
consultation.  Still worse, the DNA does not have a budget to place notices about public 
comment periods in local media around affected communities, thereby restricting the 
opportunities even citizens with internet access have to the process.  In light of these 
systemic barriers it should not be seen as surprising that the DNA has yet to receive a 
single public comment on any of the projects posted to its website. 
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 Perhaps the greatest obstacle preventing a more progressive oversight role for the 
DNA is their apparent willingness to ignore their own sustainable development 
indicators.  Much like the departmental location of the DNA, there was a bit of a struggle 
over what indicators the DNA would use for sustainable development, especially with the 
SSN Matrix being invented in their own backyard.  In a somewhat brilliant political 
move, the DNA adopted overly broad criteria that it claims it will “evaluate” CDM 
projects on the basis of, yet also pledges to “be informed by consideration” of much more 
specific project indicators inline with the SSN Matrix.128  In practice this means that legal 
recourse options against the DNA for approving any projects is somewhat limited as the 
social and economic criteria they have pledge to follow are nothing more than “Does the 
project contribute to national economic/social development?”129  The intentional 
vagueness of these questions means it is practically impossible to prove that the DNA 
erred in judging a project to be in compliance as this is entirely a subjective decision.  
They are under no obligation to follow the actual project indicators such as impact on 
local skills development, FDI, existing economic activity in the area, employment levels, 
community social structures, etc.   
 Yet even with this legal loophole where the DNA has broad discretion to judge 
CDM projects almost anyway it likes, Luwazikazi Tyani admitted “I can foresee so many 
of these projects that are not going to meet SD criteria.”130  Though she felt unable to 
elaborate on which projects these were and what stage of validation they were in, Tyani 
assured me that “these are not necessarily bad projects; they maybe good on one area, just 
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not meet the others.”131  The most troubling aspect about this situation was the ways 
Tyani proposed to deal with it.  One option she proposed was to expand the indicators so 
more projects would qualify.  Just how much more expanded “Does the project contribute 
to national economic development?” could get was unclear.   The other option proposed 
was to allow projects to go through no matter how they scored on the indicators as long 
as “they do something good with the carbon credits” such as environmental or social 
investments.132  This may seem like an adequate compromise until one recalls the 
financial additionality requirement; if a project developer can afford to use the carbon 
credits to satisfy sustainable development indicators than they are not using that money to 
make the project economically viable, and economically viable projects absent carbon 
finance are not additional.  When confronted with this reality, Tyani admitted that she 
had not considered this maybe it was best then just to expand the sustainable 
development criteria.  Strangely enough a third potential option of rejecting projects that 
failed to meet the criteria demanded of them was never mentioned in our discussion. 
3.2. The Department of Minerals and Energy  
Though the DME has already been discussed as potentially undermining efforts to 
thoroughly adjudicate the CDM projects it is trying to promote, there are other ways that 
Pretoria and this department specifically influence the carbon market and efforts to 
prevent climate change in South Africa.  The first of these if through the government’s 
White Paper on Renewable Energy that was released in 2003.  The White Paper includes 
a target of 4% of total generation from renewables by 2013, which the government never 
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fails to make reference to on the international stage.133  With such a progressive policy in 
place, there should be a plethora of opportunities and reasons for the government to 
support small-scale renewable projects that might not be able to compete against the 
‘low-hanging fruit’ in the global carbon market.  Yet this is simply not the case.  For 
starters, the 4% target is cumulative, meaning that it will be satisfied if the annual 
percentage of electricity coming from renewables every year adds up to 4% by 2013.  
Therefore if new renewable capacity goes online next year totally just 0.5% of the market 
and no other new supply goes online, this target will be satisfied.  Needless to say, this 
point usually does not make it into the government’s presentations to the international 
community.  What is more troubling is Richard Worthington’s assertion that this target 
was intentionally set so low due to the influence of the World Bank and donor countries 
such as Denmark and the Netherlands who convinced the government that this was as 
much CDM finance as they could be assured of.134 This played well into Pretoria’s 
budgetary preference not to spend any money on meeting the White Paper target.  
According to Kevin Nessip, Chief Director for DME’s Energy Planning Unit, “Green 
power is not a funding priority.  From a fiscal point of view priorities are welfare, 
healthcare, education, job creation….we’re low down on the pecking order.”135  Thus 
Pretoria has neither the budget nor the strong desire to be of much assistance to small-
scale renewable energy producers.  After all, Nessip argues, “energy should be self-
sustaining.”136 
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 While Pretoria seems content to leave renewable energy (RE) producers out in the 
cold, the national electricity company Eskom has taken a much more proactive stance in 
trying to minimize their role in the market. With complete control of the national power 
grid, Eskom is able to use this monopolistic power discriminately to limit access for 
certain producers and/or to certain customers.  This can quickly make RE economically 
unfeasible, especially when compared with Eskom’s preference for cheap coal and 
subsidized nuclear power.  In acknowledging this practice, Nessip admitted he was 
“disappointed” in Eskom and is trying to ensure non-discriminatory grid access.137  
However, a better place to start might be limiting the access Eskom has to the DME.  The 
White Paper on Renewable Energy was co-written by Eskom employees seconded to the 
DME.138  Similarly, Eskom has representatives in the official South African government 
delegation to the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, even though Eskom is the country’s largest GHG emitter.   
 If the DME’s reluctance to spend much money on renewables or challenge 
Eskom’s overwhelming political influence did not already pose enough of a challenge to 
renewable energy in South Africa, the perverse incentive of the CDM to progressive 
energy policy might be the final nail in the coffin.  The logic of the CDM as a perverse 
incentive is that if the government imposes certain standards or statutes concerning 
renewable energy or energy efficiency this will compromise the additionality requirement 
since everyone will be forced to do what is legislated rather than argue they are doing it 
because of carbon finance.  The EB/CDM has stated that it won’t allow the CDM to 
become a perverse incentive, but South African government officials already admit it has 
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been.  For example, Kevin Nessip revealed that in 2004 the government considered a 
proposal legislating solar water heaters for houses over a certain size but realized such an 
undertaken might require carbon finance and thus ‘additionality’ and therefore the 
government decided not to pursue the policy.  Similar decisions were taken around a 
mandatory blend for methane in petroleum and increasing the amount of landfill gas that 
requires capture.139  If the carbon market were actually supporting these types of projects, 
the government’s decision not to legislate in this area might not be so bad.  Yet with the 
exception of landfill gas, the market has thus far proven unwilling to engage in these 
types of projects and therefore producers are denied both the carbon capital and 
legislative impetus to develop their industry. 
3.3. Local and Provincial Governments 
With Pretoria failing to provide much in the way of oversight of CDM projects or 
incentives for renewable energy, this task has been downloaded on the other levels of 
government who are unable and/or unwilling to accept it.  Three years after the PCF 
signed the Emissions Reductions Purchase Agreement with Durban, Lindsey Strachan 
confessed “the province has only now come to grips with this project.”140  Strachan also 
recognizes “a major flaw” in the province’s ability to process documentation and cites 
examples of waiting over six months to get documents back.  It should be pointed out that 
provinces in South Africa are not nearly as powerful as they are in other federal systems 
as the country is heavily centralized so provincial governments are quite often given little 
responsibility and even less resources. 
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 This of course means even more pressure is put on the municipalities to fill the 
voids left by the other levels of government.  As one of the first African cities in the 
Cities for Climate Protection (CCP) program, Cape Town got a jump start on addressing 
this issue when it received an initial start-up budget of US$60,000 to identify ways to 
reduce its emissions and develop energy alternatives/efficiencies.  Having identified 
where the opportunities exist to reduce emissions, Cape Town is now beginning to 
allocate staff and a budget to addressing this problem.  This is supplemented with a 
public education campaign around renewable energy and climate change through Cape 
Town’s quarterly climate newsletter.  These climate initiatives are additional to the CDM 
projects in Kuyasa and Bellville. 
Yet even with all of these progressive initiatives around climate change, 
municipal officials are only too willing to admit their need for support from the national 
government to be really effective.  Craig Haskins - the head of the CCP program - admits 
“the basic model is that cities lead and the national government follows.  This is a pity 
really, as we’d love to have more leadership from the national government.”141  Cape 
Town has shown itself capable of coming up with some creative ways to address climate 
change, but without the legislative and financial resources from Pretoria there is only so 
much of an impact they can make.   
 Much like Cape Town, Durban’s experience with Pretoria underlines the lack of 
coordination and cooperation by different levels of government in South Africa around 
this issue.  When asked about this relationship, Lindsay Strachan complains “there hasn’t 
been a single phone call from Pretoria asking for the status of this project.”142  When 
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Strachan is forced to work with Pretoria he often finds himself turning to alternative 
sources to access the information he requires in a timely fashion. Yet Strachan stresses 
“the national government should be disseminating the information, not the Danish 
embassy.”143  As a result of Pretoria’s inability to be of much assistance and the 
municipality’s limited resources, Strachan has basically become the “project champion” 
for the CDM in Durban, “there has to be much more institutional support, that’s why it’s 
gone on this long…We must stay away from “project champions.”  That doesn’t work, 
the champion should be DME.”144   Finally, in demanding a more active role by the 
public sector, Strachan also explicitly rejects the notion that the private sector is filling 
this void: 
Take Mondi [South Africa’s largest pulp and paper company with two CDM 
projects in development], their own financial directors say, show me a profit in 
three years.  They openly say this, three years!  That’s the problem here, it 
shouldn’t be about profit…It won’t work if it’s not being driven by the public 
sector, they’re thinking triple bottom line, and the private sector is thinking single  
bottom line; this is a public issue, this is a global issue.”145 
 
Though the public sector may indeed by the only ones thinking about the triple bottom 
line, this has not yet resulted in many positive interventions in the South African carbon 
market by any level of government.  This apparent incapacity appears ready to be 
replicated at the international level, where as we shall now see, we find more people in 
compromised situations than proactive ones. 
3.4. International Structures 
For a CDM project to be approved it must go through two stages – the DOE and EB – 
that are not connected to its national bureaucracy.  These requirements, at least in theory, 
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help maintain proper checks and balances on the host country so even if the DNA 
approves of dubious projects that are not guaranteed CERs.  What the theory does not 
take into account is human fallibility, or to be more precise, conflicts of interest.  Such 
may be the case in both of the international verifiers associated with CDM projects in 
South Africa.   
Beginning with the DOE, one potential conflict of interest arises with the 
transnational consulting firm KPMG who is both accredited to be a DOE and is 
intimately connected to Sasol’s pipeline project. In Sasol’s PIN they state that “KPMG 
has assisted Sasol develop the CDM aspect of the SNGCP (Sasol Natural Gas Conversion 
Pipeline) since 2000.”146 In email correspondence with Sasol to verify this statement, 
Gerrit Kornelious confirmed that KPMG have “assisted (and are assisting) in drawing up 
CDM project documentation.”147 Presumably there are rules in place preventing a DOE 
from verifying a project is had previous involvement with, although I was unable to 
uncover such considerations in a thorough reading of the Marrakech Accord governing 
the CDM’s operation.  However, in the authoritative legal text on the CDM; David 
Freestone and Charlotte Streck’s Legal Aspects of Implementing the Kyoto Protocol 
Mechanisms, two program officers with the UNFCCC Secretariat in Bonn, Germany 
admitted “DOEs shall be neutral and not participate in the design of project activities and 
methodologies.”148  KPMG is clearly in violation of this requirement, which could 
compromise its neutrality in future project validations. 
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 The other oversight mechanism for CDM projects is the CDM Executive Board, 
which in the African example at least, raises just as many potential conflicts of interest as 
the KPMG example.  The only African member of the EB/CDM is a South African by 
the name of Dr. John Kilani.  In addition to his esteemed international experience, Kilani 
has an accomplished career in the South African mining industry.  He is currently the 
Senior Manager of Sustainable Development for African Rainbow Minerals and prior to 
that held a senior management position at Anglovaal, which at the time was a subsidiary 
of Anglo American.  Anglo American owns Mondi and Transalloy, both South African 
companies with CDM projects in development.  Anglo was also listed as one of Sasol’s 
major consumers of natural gas from their new pipeline.149  Though it’s doubtful a direct 
conflict of interest exists here as since Kilani is no longer employed by Anglo, this should 
at least raise some flags about the potential for corporate influence over this process.  
This contention is further supported by Kilani’s active involvement in two South African 
lobby groups: as a trustee for the “Fossil Fuel Foundation” from 2000 to 2004 and a 
representative member of the Chamber of Mines of South Africa.  As would be expected, 
Kilani’s involvement in these organizations put him on the front lines of lobbying on 
behalf of some of the very companies he could shortly be asked to certify for CERs (i.e. 
Sasol, Anglo.)  How Kilani plans to deal with theses situations are key, but the 
undeniable fact is that the South African arbitrator of last resort for the CDM is a man 
with deep ties to one of the regulated industries.  This provides little comfort for those 
worried about the problematic development of the South African carbon market. 
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4. Civilian Engagement in the Carbon Market 
With domestic and international structures raising further concerns about the South 
African carbon market rather than alleviating them, we turn our attention now to the role 
played by social actors.  As there is a multiplicity of social actors, there are numerous 
roles they play in this arena.  In an attempt to accurately portray this, social actors will be 
divided into three main categories depending on their views on carbon trading and type of 
engagement in the carbon market.  First we shall discuss the private sector developers; 
the “true believers” in the CDM whose central concern is reducing barriers to easy access 
of carbon finance.  The second group are ENGO “reformers” who recognize more serious 
problems within the carbon market, though these can be solved through the right mix of 
policy reform and oversight.  Finally, there is the international network that views carbon 
trading as inherently flawed and believe alternate solutions should be pursued.  This 
group does not believe the problems inherent in carbon market can be fixed by marginal 
adjustments but instead require a complete rethinking of our approach to fighting climate 
change and north-south relations.  Without further ado, let us now review each of these 
groups in more detail. 
4.1. Project Developers 
Among even the most ardent supporters of the CDM there is a sense that all is not well in 
the South African carbon market.  The problem, according to people like project 
developer Johan Vanderberg of Cape Town-based ‘CDM Solutions’ is one of 
institutional capacity.  For Vanderberg, it isn’t so much of the failure of the DNA to 
provide oversight of the CDM market in South Africa, but rather their inability to process 
projects quickly enough.   “The biggest issue with the CDM is that it takes a long time; 
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people put a lot of their own money on the line and there are lots of obstacles to 
overcome.  Coming to bank-ability [read: CER purchase agreement] means giving up a 
pound of flesh in transaction costs.”150  Vanderberg estimates that it costs approximately 
R40,000 to get a project approved and a minimum of six months.  This cost and time 
commitment are prohibitive to small-scale producers doing either energy efficiency or 
renewable energy.  Even if project developers are able to finance the process and commit 
the time getting a project verified, there are still uncertainties around whether the project 
will be approved and how much they can sell the carbon credits for.   
Though the government cannot set the spot market price of carbon to address this 
latter concern, project developers argue that they could increase the efficiency of the 
approval process, which will both reduce the time lag and the costs involved.  “A fast 
track procedure is sorely needed,” Vanderberg argues. “There should be a prime face 
view that a CDM project is environmentally beneficial.”151  The suggestion is that since 
projects already reduce GHG emissions, the DNA’s sustainable development indicators 
are just unnecessary andd inefficient bureaucratic red tape.  The idea of requiring a Gold 
Standard or similarly applied benchmarks is “like saying to a guy with a heart transplant, 
if this doesn’t take away the wrinkles on your face you can’t get a new heart.”152 
 At the root of much of the opposition to the costs and time involved in project 
verification is an unwavering faith in the free market not shared by other social actors in 
this field.  Michael Goldblatt, a CDM consultant for the Palma Development Group, 
believes “the CDM is a more innocuous than people realize…the national government 
doesn’t have that much of role to play, just make sure they’re not an obstacle and let the 
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market develop.”153  Presumably Goldblatt agrees with Vanderberg that rigorous 
oversight of the carbon market is such an obstacle to its proper development, though this 
argument is rooted as more in an ideological faith in the market than in practical 
examples of where fewer regulations have produced better projects. 
 In terms of advocacy, these ‘true believers’ engage in more closed door 
campaigns where they are able to leverage their very privileged access to politicians and 
bureaucrats to influence outcomes in their favour.  The root of this access varies 
depending on the project developer.  For persons like Gerrit Kornelius at Sasol it comes 
from the power of being one of the country’s largest corporations with deep political ties 
to the state.  For small business developers, like Michael Goldblatt, it comes from a long 
history of engagement on the issue.  In 2001, Goldblatt authored the South African 
National Strategy Study on the CDM, commissioned by the World Bank and Pretoria.  
Following its release, Goldblatt continued to serve as a consultant for the DNA and 
oversaw the consultation process around which department it should be located in.   
 Palpable results of the project developer’s market interventions can be seen in the 
future projects that are approved and policy changes undertaken.  To listen to Luwazikazi 
Tyani at the DNA speak about broadening the sustainability criteria to approve of more 
projects, it appears the government is only too ready to cooperate. 
 
4.2. Domestic ENGOs 
For the vast majority of ENGOs in South Africa the problems associated with the carbon 
market run much deeper than what project developers would like to think, and thus 
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require much more creative and engaged solutions.  The views of this broad community 
can be fairly accurately represented through just two organizations: South South North 
and the South Africa Climate Action Network.  SSN, as has been previously mentioned, 
has been involved with the CDM longer and more intensely than probably any other 
ENGO in the world but certainly more than anyone else in South Africa.  SACAN’s 
involvement is somewhat more limited as they deal with all aspects of climate change, 
not just carbon trading.  Having said that, SACAN has taken a number of strong positions 
around the CDM and since they are a network of sixteen ENGOs across South Africa it is 
fair to assume that many of these positions are widely held in the non-profit sector. 
 One of the first key differences between these ENGOs and the project developers 
is their comprehension and in some cases sympathy with the ideological critiques against 
carbon trading.  In the July 2002 edition of “Climate Action News,” SACAN’s quarterly 
newsletter that is disseminated throughout South Africa – the headline of the front cover 
story on the CDM read “Can we justify selling Africa’s atmosphere?”  The fire line of 
this story was even more to the point on the ideological critique of carbon trading; 
“The rich developed countries have emitted most of the greenhouse gases currently 
in the atmosphere and now the more enlightened of them are prepared to pay to 
further pollute our atmosphere, or more exactly, they will provide money so that 
they can continue their pollution while we decrease ours.”154 
 
The concern that the CDM is maintaining an unequally access to the atmosphere between 
rich and poor countries was also recognized by Sheriene Rosenberg at SSN who in the 
context of certain dubious projects admitted, “you shouldn’t be selling off your crown 
jewels so the North can keep polluting.”155 
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 While appreciating some of these theoretical critiques, ENGOs see the injustices 
of the CDM can be seen most clearly in some of its more controversial projects.  From 
the moment Sasol announced its intent to have its pipeline recognized as a CDM project 
SACAN has been publicly denouncing it.  In the November 2003 issue of Climate Action 
News, Richard Worthington made clear that “SACAN is totally opposed to Sasol 
claiming credits for the project under CDM.”156  The concern for Worthington was that 
the project has been in the pipe-line for many years and was “motivated by improved 
efficiency with long-term cost-savings as well as dwindling coal reserves in the vicinity 
of the plant.”157  To try to claim CDM credits for this is “clearly an opportunistic add-on” 
and should be rejected for a lack of additionality as well as the improved efficiencies that 
will entail a net loss of jobs, thus failing the sustainable development criteria. 
 The other project that is widely opposed by ENGOs in South Africa is not 
surprisingly Bisasar Road.  For SSN, the cause of all the problems in Durban lies with the 
involvement of the Prototype Carbon Fund and the World Bank.  The argument against 
the PCF is that it is governed solely by free market ideals, which are often in conflict with 
community benefits.  In their words, the PCF is after “a cheap bang for their buck; they 
basically just get the low cost credits… [they] pillage the country and don’t contribute to 
their sustainable development.”158  SACAN holds a similar suspicion around this project 
and devoted their March 2003 newsletter to a debate on it.  This debate raised a number 
of critiques of the project from activists across South Africa including the PCF’s motives, 
the incentive for poor waste management, a lack of community consultation, and the lack 
of commitment on a specific closure date. 
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 While these ENGOs have found plenty of problems with the CDM and seem to 
sympathize with the claim that free market economics contributes to this, they reject the 
idea that the two forces must be addressed simultaneously.  Richard Worthington 
believes that rejecting Kyoto on the basis of its flawed market mechanism implies,  
“we have to change the world economic system before tackling climate change.  
Sure, I’d love it if we had a more co-operative economic system in place, but we 
can’t wait for that before tackling climate change...[This] a poor strategy that 
plays into the hands of Bush.”159  
 
Thus a more reformist approach to the problem is adopted, rooted in the acceptance that 
“Whether we like it or not, there will be trade in certified emission reductions; the best 
we can do is influence how these are created.”160    
 In practical terms, the attempts of ENGOs to influence this process is by shaming 
bad projects, supporting better ones, and advocating for strong reforms so there is more to 
support and less to shame.  A number of references have already been made to how 
SACAN uses their newsletter to inform many activists on the ground about some of the 
problems with the CDM and shame projects that reflect this.  As a network they are also 
able to use other means to get their message out, such as when Worthington emailed over 
forty social actors engaged in this issue about Peter Geef’s confession that Sasol’s project 
is not additional the morning after it was made.  In terms of more active engagement 
around negative projects, SACAN has written to the PCF and DSW expressing their 
concerns over the Durban project and also conveyed their opposition to this and other 
projects in Pretoria. 
 Despite Worthington’s belief that the Kuyasa project is a poor financial model for 
a CDM project, SACAN has been a strong public supporter of it and continues to support 
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the Gold Standard as a necessary reform model to maximize the benefits of carbon 
trading.  This is also the position of SSN who for all intents and purposes is the 
intellectual force behind the Gold Standard.   The strategy employed in supporting the 
Gold Standard is active on a number of levels: through a domestic campaign with the 
DNA, internationally through the Conferences of the Parties, and within the market itself 
where these projects are “incentivized” to be seen as appealing to purchasers of CERs.161 
 As to the success of the reformers’ efforts, the most obvious one to quantify is the 
fact that SSN has had a Gold Standard project certified and has another on its way.  This 
has certainly raised the profile of an alternative model to the ‘low hanging fruit’ 
associated with the PCF and some of the other questionable projects.  As to legislative 
reforms, the ENGOs appear to have failed in their campaign to have the DNA adopt the 
Gold Standard or other objective criteria that projects would have to meet to get their 
approval.  In fact, most ENGOs do not appear aware of the project developers’ desires to 
loosen the weak criteria already in place and may get sideswiped in such a campaign.  At 
the international level, efforts to get the G77 to adopt the Gold Standard have also thus 
far proved elusive as “rather than use it to further everyone’s  collective interests, (the 
G77) has become a vehicle for them to keep tabs on each other.”162  
 Despite some of these setbacks, ENGOs continue to engage heavily in trying to 
shape the South African carbon market and it is safe to assume for all its flaws it may 
have developed in even more troubling ways without their input. 
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4.3. The Climate Justice Activists 
The birth of the global grassroots movement against carbon trading was a conference 
titled “Commodifying Carbon: Consequences and Strategies” in October 2004 in Durban.  
The conference was attended by nearly thirty energy and environmental activists, 
academics, and persons from affected communities.  Every continent was represented at 
the meeting and the majority of the participants were from the Global South.  Throughout 
the weekend-long meeting stories about the affects of CDM projects across the world 
were shared, activist bonds were formed, and strategies to combat the carbon market 
were discussed.  Perhaps the most important outcome of the meeting was the creation of 
the “Durban Declaration.”  Under the banner of “Climate Justice Now!” the meetings’ 
participants rejected the claim that “carbon trading will halt the climate crisis.”163  Rather 
this crisis is caused by the mining and use of fossil fuels, something that carbon trading 
fails and in many ways solidifies, thus making it a “false solution which entrenches and 
magnifies social inequalities.”  In its conclusion, the Declaration committed to  
“seek real solutions [to the climate crisis] that are viable and truly sustainable and 
that do not sacrifice marginalized communities…[and] to help build a global 
grassroots movement for climate justice, mobilize communities around the world 
and pledge our solidarity with people opposing carbon trading on the ground. 
 
Taking its name from the declaration and conference location, the Durban Group for 
Climate Justice (“Durban Group”) has indeed developed as a global grassroots 
movement, as pledged in the Declaration.  In the days following the conference an 
internet listserv was established to allow the participants to disseminate information on 
carbon trading and climate change developments in a quick and inexpensive fashion as 
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well as coordinate events and campaigns.  As more groups and individuals signed the 
Declaration so to did the listserv grow to include wider perspectives and more regions.  
 As to the strategic activities of the Durban Group, the first event they had a 
presence in following the meeting was the tenth Conference of the Parties (COP10) in 
Buenos Aries, Argentina in December, 2004.  At COP10 a number of members of the 
Durban Group held a well-attended side event on the impacts of the CDM on local and 
indigenous communities in the Global South.  The following month a larger number of 
members were able to attend the World Social Forum in Porto Allegre, Brazil, where 
members held well attended public discussions on carbon trading, met more privately 
with other ENGOs to discuss the issue and possible strategic alliances, and to plan their 
own campaigns for the following year.  These activities came to include an open letter to 
Kofi Annan and the United Nation about their concerns over carbon trading and the CDM 
on 16 February 2005, the day the Kyoto Protocol came into force.  With Tony Blair 
making climate change one of the central issues of the G8 meeting in Gleneagles, 
Scotland in July, members of the Durban Group released a publication critical of the G8 
countries’ climate change and carbon trading policies just prior to the meeting.164   
Perhaps the Durban Group’s most high profile international activism to date was 
the Eleventh Conference of the Parties meeting in Montreal in late 2005.  Making use of 
some strong local contacts, the Durban Group was able to run a ‘Climate Justice 
Convergence Centre’ just four blocks from the conference centre for the entire two weeks 
of its duration.  The Convergence Centre was the only real space for activists away from 
the conference facilities and thus significant amounts of strategizing and networking went 
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on there, in addition to a daily workshop and film series.  Inside the COP itself, the 
Durban Group also held a number of press conferences highlighting such issues as the 
World Bank’s detrimental role in climate change and the carbon market, as well as a 
solidarity event with the Costa Rican government for their moratorium on oil and gas 
exploration.  Though the conference itself spent very little time on the CDM other than to 
adopt the Marrakech Accord as international law, carbon trading played a very prominent 
role in the many side events and workshops over the two weeks.165 
 In terms of the presence of the Durban Group in South Africa, participants at the 
October 2004 conference have almost exclusively confined their strategic actions to the 
struggle around Bisasar Road and have shown little awareness and less engagement with 
other CDM projects.  The activities around Bisasar Road include op-ed pieces in national 
media (a piece co-authored by Patrick Bond and Trusha Reddy in the Mail & Guardian) 
and the making of short film on the subject for the South African Broadcasting 
Corporation by local filmmaker Rehana Dada.  Amsterdam-based Carbon Trade Watch 
and other organizations involved with the Durban Group also issued a public letter to the 
PCF articulating their concerns over the lack of consultations on the CDM project and its 
entrenching of environmental injustices in the community.  Finally, Sajida Khan has 
continued her courageous court battle against the landfill, though it should be noted that 
this commenced long before the Durban Group was formed. 
 Though it seems premature to judge the impacts of the Durban Group less that 18 
months after it has formed, it can lauded for being the lone critic of carbon trading left in 
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the international arena following COP9 in Marrakech, the last time major ENGOs 
discussed the subject.   Moreover, as more signatories are added to the declaration it 
appears that their message is resonating with a lot of people frustrated by the status quo 
of continued growth of emissions in most Annex 1 countries.  Yet for the most part this 
has yet to translate into successful local campaigns against carbon trading projects in 
Southern countries.  South Africa is no exception to this and one could argue that with 
the exception of Bisasar Road project, signatories to the Durban declaration in South 
Africa have had less impact on their own carbon market than the more moderate ENGOs 
who are not signatories.  How these climate justice activists can translate their strong 
critiques against CDM projects into on-the-ground successes for fence-line communities 
will be the next challenge for this emerging network. 
 
 - 83 -
Conclusion 
This study set out to investigate the ways in which the carbon market has developed in 
South Africa and the influence of institutional and social actors therein.  Reflecting on the 
outcome of this research, it appears that many of the troubling trends apparent in the 
global carbon market are being replicated in South Africa.  These include dubious 
projects adversely impacting local communities, profit-oriented private sector developers 
neglecting additionality, and community-supported renewable energy projects – that were 
to be the centrepiece of the CDM – remaining unsustainable on carbon finance alone.  At 
an institutional level, compromised and/or under-resourced civil servants are unable to 
address these contradictions.  As for social actors, the more faith organizations have in 
the carbon market (and thus the more inline with the government’s objectives) the more 
influence they appear to have with these market forces.  Social actors more critical of 
trading have begun to raise the profile of the issue in the international policy arena, yet 
the actual struggle against projects on the ground continues to be in isolation with no 
activist networking or widespread opposition to carbon trading in South Africa.  This puts 
local communities at an even greater disadvantage when they wish to engage in this 
process as they are challenged by the elite-centred technical jargon and complex 
processes. 
By all accounts this is a sobering indictment of the carbon market’s first inroads 
into an African country and its failure thus far to simultaneously accommodate the needs 
of local communities while preserving the global climate.  In concluding this 
investigation I would like to humbly offer some suggestions on how we can greatly 
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improve this situation for South Africans and the rest of the planet.  These will consider 
process and substance in South Africa, reforming Northern priorities, and post-2012. 
 
Reforms in South Africa 
The first suggestion I would offer for the carbon market in South Africa would be to 
change the process by which projects are developed and approved from one that is 
imposed on the local community to one where the community’s needs are front and 
centre every step of the way.  This could be done through a revised Gold Standard 
certification system that placed as much emphasis on the process by which the projects 
are developed as on the sustainability of their outcome.  The Gold Standard is currently 
endorsed by international ENGOs such as Greenpeace and WWF as well as Canadian 
ENGOs such as the David Suzuki Foundation and the Sierra Club of Canada.  Yet the 
previous analysis of the Bellville South landfill project shows that, as it currently 
functions, the Gold Standard cannot guarantee local benefits and support.  Possible 
process-based Gold Standard reforms could include a duty to do structured in-person 
consultations in the community and show evidence of incorporating community feedback 
into the project design in order to be validated.  This would represent an enormous 
improvement over the current internet based comment periods that are consultation in 
name only.  A further process based suggestion would be to have the community appoint 
one of their representatives to the verification and monitoring process.  There is little use 
in undertaking greater efforts to ensure the community’s needs are incorporated into 
project designs if the monitoring and verification are left to Northern-based Designated 
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Operational Entities like DSV or KPMG who have little or no concern for the local 
communities. 
While an improved Gold Standard could certainly help guide project-development 
in a better direction, a philosophical change is also required among project developers.  
The current system is one where most projects are designed and selected by outside 
organizations and consultancies (i.e. the World Bank, EcoSecurities) on the basis of the 
maximum return on investment for Northern investors.  It should be little surprise that 
under this system, communities see these projects as imposed on them rather than 
something that they have ownership over.  As we saw in Kuyasa, community ownership 
of these projects comes from going into the communities and assessing what their needs 
are and how the carbon market can meet them, rather than beginning from the starting 
point of the needs of Northern countries for cheap credits and then finding a Southern 
community to exploit.  No matter how regulated the carbon market is, Southern 
communities may still suffer from it if project developers do not change their priorities to 
focus on uplifting such communities first and benefiting wealthy Northern countries 
second.  Suffice it to say in the opinion of this author, certain organizations such as the 
World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund have demonstrated a clear historical incapacity to 
think in such terms and thus their involvement in this market should be minimized to the 
greatest extent possible. 
 
Northern Reforms 
Changes to the Gold Standard and the mindset of project developers can do much to alter 
the supply of bad projects but such reforms will soon be moot if Northern countries 
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continue to demand them.  The situation requires drastic action on two fronts.  The first is 
to go back to the language of Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol: “Any such [carbon] 
trading shall be supplemental to domestic actions for the purpose of meeting quantified 
emission limitation and reduction commitments under that Article.”166  According to the 
Marrakesh Accord on the rules around flexibility mechanisms, which was recently 
codified in law when adopted at MOP1 in Montreal, supplemental to domestic action 
means that “domestic action shall thus constitute a significant element of the effort made 
by each Party included in Annex I…” Yet in 2000 the Dutch government made available 
a budget to buy 50 percent of its Kyoto target of a six percent reduction by 2012 as 
credits from the Joint Implementation and Clean Development Mechanism instruments. 
This target equals 100 million tons of carbon dioxide equivalent.167  In 2005 the Canadian 
government released Project Green, a plan to meet their Kyoto targets, nearly half of 
which (115 MT of CO2e) was allocated in a Climate Fund that could be used to purchase 
CDM/JI credits.  While these governments seem content to exploit the somewhat 
ambiguous language of international law in this area, their citizens must start to do a 
better job holding them accountable for reaching their targets primarily through domestic 
actions and leaving CDM credits as truly supplemental.  According to the Canadian 
Oxford Dictionary, supplemental means, “Something added to complete a thing, make up 
for a deficiency, or extend or strengthen the whole.”  Setting a target of 80% reductions 
being met through domestic actions seems a lot more of a “significant effort” than a mere 
half and half split.  This position could easily be adopted by a coalition of ENGOs, along 
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with renewable energy producers and municipalities who stand to benefit from domestic 
emission reductions efforts. 
The second focus for Northern countries is to make sure that any CERs they 
purchase between now and 2012 come from the best possible CDM projects and not the 
so-called low-hanging fruit.  This can be achieved through the adoption of an “ethical 
purchasing policy” by the CDM/JI office in Canada and its equivalent in other countries.  
Such a policy would, as a first priority, focus on renewable energy projects that have 
clear environmental and developmental benefits for local communities.  Projects that are 
certified under a revised Gold Standard (with process-based indicators) would be given 
top priority.  Should there not be enough Gold Standard projects to meet 20% of 
Canada’s target by 2012, other projects could be considered with some caveats.  Landfill 
gas capture projects in urban landfills that have not been closed are out. As are carbon 
sinks due to the increasingly shaky science around the carbon ledger between biological 
and fossil carbon.  Finally, anything associated with the Prototype Carbon Fund should 
not be considered and Canada should withdrawal immediately as one of the PCF’s 
funders.  This should not be seen as an exhaustive list but more an indication of the types 
of consideration Northern countries should be giving to their purchase of CERs. 
 
Post-2012 Reforms 
In devising the previous suggested reforms I took it as a given that the carbon market will 
remain integral to the functioning of the Kyoto Protocol until it expires in 2012 and thus 
the various solutions offered were intended to achieve a best-case scenario up until that 
point.  However, climate change policy post-2012 has yet to be determined and I reject 
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the assumption that the carbon market must be the centre-piece of the next global climate 
change framework.  Rather, if we are indeed serious about preventing catastrophic 
climate change, I submit that it is imperative that we look beyond market mechanisms.  
 The fundamental flaw of market mechanisms in delivering this world to a 
sustainable climate is nothing more than the market logic they are governed by.  It has 
previously been suggested that carbon investors are more concerned about their return on 
investment than ensuring local and global sustainability.  This explains why “low-
hanging fruit” makes up such a large portion of the carbon credits issued to date and why 
problems of additionality continue to plague the market.  One need not study the carbon 
market in South Africa to come to such conclusions.  During an official Montreal 2005 
side event sponsored by the International Emissions Trading Association and the World 
Bank's Prototype Carbon Fund, some of the most intelligent minds in carbon finance 
shared some frank assessments on the market.  Jack Cogen, president of Natsource, 
currently the largest private sector buyer of carbon credits, made one of the more candid 
observations on the panel; "The carbon market doesn't care about sustainable 
development. All it cares about is the carbon price…the carbon market is not going to be 
able to put sustainable development and everything else into one price."168  During the 
same panel discussion, James Cameron, a London-based carbon trader with Climate 
Change Capital, admitted that additionality requirements force project developers into 
dishonest situations where “they have to tell their backers that their projects are going to 
make lots of money, but tell the UN that they wouldn’t be financially viable [without 
carbon finance.]”169   
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What I found most shocking about these statements is not their actual substance – 
three months of researching CDM projects in South Africa already taught me that the 
carbon market tends to ignore sustainability and additionality – it was the fact that when 
they were said no one else in the room seemed surprised at all.  No one challenged these 
quotes or made any real attempt to defend the carbon market’s legitimacy in these areas.  
The sense I got from the room full of people in business suits (mostly white men) was 
that they accept that this is still a market and its job is to make money and if it does this 
than everyone will have done their job.  Their job is not to guarantee community benefits.  
Their job is not to prevent catastrophic climate change.  This might have been the job of 
other delegates at the UN Conference, but for the men in this room their focus was much 
simpler than that.  Yet at the end of the day, it is not an understatement to suggest that 
these are in fact the people we are entrusting our future to, which becomes a very scary 
proposition when we actually listen to what they have to say about this responsibility.   
Emissions trading has indeed effectively transferred the responsibility for 
sustainable development and the global climate over to the private sector.  Now nearly a 
decade after the signing of the Kyoto Protocol there is ample evidence to suggest that this 
was a mistake.  Further regulating the carbon market can soften the harsher consequences 
of this mistake, but this should not be seen as anything more than a Band-aid solution.  
To actually fix this planet, what is needed post-2012 is an entirely new approach.  I 
remain quite hesitant to offer ideas of what that approach should be as I feel strongly that 
such solutions should come from the ground up in communities most urgently affected by 
climate change, rather than from a privileged academic living in the part of the world that 
has caused this problem.  Accepting that I cannot change who I am however, I will 
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humbly refer to one such solution that is not market based.  This is the idea of a Clean 
Development Fund, which was the original precursor to the CDM as proposed by the 
Brazilian delegation in Kyoto.  A Clean Development Fund would be used to jump-start 
renewable energy projects in the Global South and help assist their decarbonisation track, 
much in the way that the CDM was once promised to do as well.  The key difference 
however is that the Fund would not function as a free-market but rather be funded 
through a series of levies on Annex 1 countries who failed to reach annual reductions 
targets.  Such a system would not be perfect and there would still be a need to ensure 
community benefits and oversight around issues like additionality; preference would still 
be given to projects that would not have happened absent funding.  Accepting these 
challenges, such a system would still remain a vast improvement over the carbon market 
as its governing logic would be ensuring sustainability and emissions reductions as 
opposed to the opposite of making money. 
As exciting as a scheme like the Clean Development Fund is, I do not wish to 
create the impression that climate change can be solved by international law alone.  It 
cannot.  Rather, it is a question of struggle: struggles against injustice, against oil 
companies, against co-opted politicians, against this crony carbon market, and struggles 
in our own lives to use less energy.  To take it back to South Africa, this is where I draw 
inspiration from for such a struggle.  The residents of Clare Estates took on the World 
Bank and through their tireless activism and recourse to the courts have thus far 
prevented their landfill from being granted a new lease on life under the guise of the 
CDM.  The Sasolburg Air Quality Monitoring Committee and other activists in the South 
African Climate Action Network are struggling against one of the most powerful 
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companies in the country to prevent Sasol from getting dubious credits for a pipeline they 
admit is not additional.  There is every reason to believe this is why Sasol has not yet 
submitted its official project documents and might not ever.  The residents of Kuyasa 
have had an easier struggle in securing their community-based renewable energy project, 
but have played an equally important role in exposing the myth of the carbon market 
through their strong support of a project that is admittedly not sustainable on carbon 
finance alone.  These communities are united by a desire for a better life, rooted in a 
cleaner environment.  As these struggles are united and their voices amplified we may 
one day come to taste the sweet fruits of a new lease on the life of our climate, rather than 
the sour taste of the carbon market’s low-hanging fruit. 
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